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Over the last century, countless pages have been filled by 
advocates and academics, courts and commentators, all offering 
insights and suggested improvements for juvenile justice in the 
United States.1 In recent years, one practice in particular has drawn 
increased attention and criticism—transferring youth from our 
nation’s juvenile system into criminal courts for adult prosecution 
and prison sentences.2 
Numerous voices have joined the movement to challenge the 
imposition of lengthy adult prison terms for kids convicted of serious 
crimes. Given their special vulnerabilities and the need for treatment 
rather than punishment, critics argue that young felony offenders 
should have their cases handled in our country’s specialized juvenile 
courts, where they might receive age-appropriate interventions 
intended to support redirection and healthy development.3 
 
 1.  Many advocates and experts have taken on issues like the overuse of pre-trial 
detention in juvenile courts and conditions of confinement in juvenile detention centers.  See, 
e.g., SARAH ALICE BROWN, TRENDS IN JUVENILE JUSTICE STATE LEGISLATION: 2011-2015 
(2015), http://www.modelsforchange.net/publications/783; ANNIE BALCK, ADVANCES IN 
JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM: 2009-2011 (2012), http://www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-
library/NJJN_adv_fin_press_sept_update.pdf; BARRY HOLMAN & JASON ZIEDENBERG, 
JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, THE DANGERS OF DETENTION: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATING 
YOUTH IN DETENTION AND OTHER SECURE FACILITIES (2013), 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/06-11_rep_dangersofdetention_jj.pdf; BILL 
RUST, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., JUVENILE JAILHOUSE ROCKED: REFORMING DETENTION IN 
CHICAGO, PORTLAND, AND SACRAMENTO (1999), http://www.aecf.org/resources/juvenile-
jailhouse-rocked-reforming-detention-in-chicago-portland-and-sacra/; James Austin et al., 
Alternatives to the Secure Detention and Confinement of Juvenile Offenders, OJJDP JUVENILE 
JUSTICE BULL. (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, D.C.), Sept. 2005, http://www.networkofcare.org/ 
library/alternativestoyouthdetention.pdf. These efforts have resulted in the reform of juvenile 
detention practices across the country. 
 2.   See, e.g., JEFFREY A. BUTTS, RESEARCH AND EVALUATION DATABITS, TRANSFER OF 
JUVENILES TO CRIMINAL COURT IS NOT CORRELATED WITH FALLING YOUTH VIOLENCE 
(2012), http://johnjayresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/databit2012_05.pdf; 
Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Transfer Laws: An Effective Deterrent to Delinquency?, OJJDP 
JUVENILE JUSTICE BULL. (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, D.C.), Aug. 2008, http://www.cclp.org/ 
documents/Alternatives/Juvenile%20Transfer%20Laws%20OJJDP.pdf. 
 3.  See, e.g., ESTIVALIZ CASTRO ET AL., CAL. ALL., TREAT KIDS AS KIDS: WHY YOUTH 
SHOULD BE KEPT IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (2014), http://jjustice.org/wordpress/ 
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Interestingly, these conversations have almost entirely overlooked 
another set of important legal venues and their juvenile justice 
implications—those adjudicating low-level offenses such as local 
traffic and ordinance violations. There has been little scholarly, 
judicial, or advocacy address of the almost underground 
phenomenon of prosecuting minors in municipal courts. 
This Essay calls for greater attention to the issue. It does so in 
the wake of recent events in Ferguson, Missouri. As covered by 
national and international news, residents of Ferguson—along with 
allies across the region, country, and globe—protested the shooting 
death of Michael Brown, an unarmed Black teenager, who was killed 
in August 2014 by white municipal police officer, Darren Wilson.4 
Not only did this event spark calls for Officer Wilson’s arrest, police 
reforms, and racial justice more generally,5 but somewhat remarkably, 
it also generated wide-spread agreement that local courts needed to 
change the way they process, prosecute, and punish low-level 
ordinance violations.6 
Indeed, as the nation has now discovered, in part due to the 
Department of Justice’s investigation of the Ferguson police and 
 
wp-content/uploads/CAYCJ-treat-kids-as-kids-Oct-2014.pdf; DANIELLE MOLE & DODD 
WHITE, TRANSFER AND WAIVER IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 24 (2005) (noting 
“Juveniles who are transferred to the adult criminal justice system have poorer outcomes than 
comparable youth sentenced in the juvenile court system”) http://66.227.70.18/programs/ 
juvenilejustice/jjtransfer.pdf; Marsha Levick, As Another Young Boy Commits Suicide in an 
Adult Prison, We Must Rethink the Prosecution of Children as Adults, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG 
(Nov. 23, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marsha-levick/as-another-young-boy-
comm_b_5862590.html. 
 4.  See, e.g., Sara Sidner, Activist Cornel West among 49 People Arrested at Ferguson 
Protests, CNN (Oct. 13, 2014, 8:47 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/13/us/ferguson-
protests/; Ferguson Unrest: From Shooting to Nationwide Protests, BBC NEWS (Aug. 10, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-30193354. 
 5.  See, e.g., Jamelle Bouie, Why the Fires in Ferguson Won’t End Soon, SLATE (Aug. 19, 
2014, 6:42 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/08/ 
ferguson_protests_over_michael_brown_won_t_end_soon_the_black_community.html (“The 
tensions have been building for a long time, and even justice for Michael Brown won’t change 
that.”); Daniel Wallis & Edward McAllister, Ferguson Demonstrators Begin 120-Mile March to 
Missouri State Capital, REUTERS (Nov. 29, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
missouri-shooting-idUSKCN0J80PR20141129 (reporting one racial justice march participant 
noted: “This isn’t just about St. Louis. We are speaking for other cities, other countries, too”). 
 6.  See, e.g., Jennifer S. Mann, Cries for Reform in Traffic Courts Grow Louder in Wake 
of Ferguson, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Sept. 5, 2014, 11:30 PM), 
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/cries-for-reform-in-traffic-courts-
grow-louder-in-wake/article_0295f598-7421-515a-8c52-337a36b7cc71.html. 
QUINN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2016  2:13 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
1250 
court system,7 the aggressive pursuit of fines and court fees through 
traffic cases and related quality-of-life actions has been one of the 
most troubling aspects of life for many St. Louis, Missouri residents.8 
But the experiences of juveniles—youth under the age of eighteen—
have received much less attention in the course of these critiques and 
calls for municipal court reform. 
Yet in some places, like Ferguson, young people, considered 
juveniles by United States Supreme Court standards, face automatic 
municipal court prosecution without any prior certification hearing 
or specialized legal protections.9 
This Article suggests we draw lessons from Ferguson and work 
proactively to improve local municipal court practices across the 
country in the days ahead. In particular, we should redirect young 
people from municipal dockets largely focused on enhancing local 
finances, to age-appropriate, specialized juvenile courts intended to 
support youth. There, minor conflicts with the law should be 
resolved informally as an acknowledgment that kids will—and 
should—be kids. 
This Article will proceed in four parts. Part I describes the ways 
in which most people conceive of youth contact with the justice 
system—either through juvenile or criminal courts. It begins by 
discussing juvenile courts, outlining their history and goals, as well as 
the rights they must provide to youth. It also notes that while legal 
 
 7.  U.S. DEPT. JUST., C.R. DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf. 
 8.  See Radley Balko, How Municipalities in St. Louis County, Mo., Profit from Poverty, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/ 
2014/09/03/how-st-louis-county-missouri-profits-from-poverty/; Conor Friedersdorf, 
Ferguson’s Conspiracy Against Black Citizens, ATLANTIC (Mar. 5, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/03/ferguson-as-a-criminal-conspiracy-
against-its-black-residents-michael-brown-department-of-justice-report/386887/ (“Ferguson 
officials repeatedly behaved as if their priority is not improving public safety or protecting the 
rights of residents, but maximizing the revenue that flows into city coffers.”). 
 9.  See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 211.021(2) (2010) (defining child generally for 
purposes of juvenile delinquency prosecution as anyone under the age of 17, thereby allowing 
all 17 year olds to be directly filed into the municipal and criminal court systems); MO. REV. 
STAT. § 211.031.1(2) & (3) (2015) (carving further out an exception for 15 and 16 year olds, 
allowing municipal courts to prosecute them for traffic, curfew, and tobacco offenses), compare 
with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding, in a Missouri case, that anyone under 
the age of eighteen is considered a juvenile against whom a death sentence may not be 
imposed under the Eighth Amendment). 
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protections within these institutions are constitutionally required—
juvenile courts themselves are not. That is, at least to date, appellate 
courts have declined to find that children in conflict with the law 
have a constitutional right to juvenile courts as venues of first resort. 
Part I continues with a discussion of the long-standing practice 
of excluding some youth from juvenile courts, prosecuting them in 
criminal courts, and sentencing them as adults. It also summarizes a 
growing body of literature and wave of advocacy that calls for an end 
to harsh adult prison terms for youth. This work focuses largely on 
lengthy sentences for homicides and other serious crimes. 
It further describes one significant result of this movement—the 
emergence of enhanced constitutional rights and protections at 
criminal sentencing proceedings for youth under the age of eighteen. 
Such substantive changes and safeguards are largely rooted in 
modern adolescent development teachings. Yet these critiques and 
remedies have almost entirely ignored a third kind of court that 
impacts kids—local municipal courts. 
Part II provides an overview of United States municipal courts, 
using St. Louis County’s ninety municipalities generally, and the 
Ferguson Municipal Court in particular, as a lens. Part III then sheds 
light on contemporary local practices for kids in municipal courts, in 
Ferguson and around the country, that undermine state and federal 
juvenile justice laws and policies that see youth as different from 
adult offenders. 
Part IV suggests that we draw insights from efforts to protect 
juveniles in the most serious cases and apply them to minor 
municipal court matters. First, common sense suggests most kids 
belong in courts created for kids. While public shaming and 
punishing poverty are unacceptable practices for adults, they are even 
more unconscionable when visited upon children. Thus, referring 
youth to child-centered confidential juvenile courts rather than 
municipal courts comports with contemporary and historic concerns 
about young people and their special needs. 
Second, it explains that deploying localized punitive practices 
against children amounts to what I refer to as “in loco juvenile 
justice,” which displaces both state and federal standards intended to 
protect youth. Like traditional in loco parentis doctrine, where the 
state steps into the role of parent for the child, municipalities seem 
to be attempting to step into the role of the state vis a vis juveniles 
and juvenile justice. The Latin term in loco also captures the 
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localized, place-specific nature of municipalities and their courts. 
Finally, the phrase evokes the feeling of irrationality presented by 
municipal courts serving as a shadow juvenile justice system, 
undermining the goals and intentions of state and federal youth laws 
and policies. 
For instance, state contract doctrines preclude adults from 
collecting debts from kids. And federal law generally prohibits 
detaining juveniles based on status offenses or jailing them with 
adults for any alleged wrongdoing. Ordering children to satisfy court 
fines or face the possibility of liberty deprivation for minor youthful 
indiscretions is not only inconsistent with such federal policies, but 
potentially preempted on state law grounds. 
Emerging standards around youth sentencing and justice in 
serious felony matters provide further powerful support for a 
constitutional right to juvenile court treatment. While such a right 
has not been recognized to date, this Article argues the Supreme 
Court’s evolving standards for youth—cases from the last decade, 
Roper v. Simmons,10 Graham v. Florida,11 Miller v. Alabama,12 and In 
re JDB13—may finally provide firm footing for such a claim. 
Thus, the Ferguson crisis should be seen as an opportunity to 
embrace more humane practices when dealing with kids in conflict 
with the law—even for low-level local ordinance violations. Policing 
and prosecuting youth should involve age-appropriate interactions 
and interventions, with juvenile courts serving as the default legal 
venue. Current events demonstrate that in loco juvenile justice 
practices—localized efforts that displace state, federal, and 
constitutional youth laws and policies—are no longer invisible 
or appropriate. 
 
 10.  543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 11.  560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 12.  132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 13.  131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). 
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I. KIDS IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW: THE JUVENILE VERSUS 
CRIMINAL COURT STORY 
The United States maintains a conflicted conception of youth 
when it comes to courts, crimes, and case processing.14 On one hand, 
our state justice systems have developed countless child-centered 
venues called juvenile courts, where youth are processed when they 
allegedly break the law.15 And the United States Supreme Court has 
provided basic due process protections to kids who face prosecution 
in these courts.16 
On the other hand, in some instances we frame kids and their 
alleged crimes as so non-childlike that we prosecute them in our 
state criminal court systems and punish them as adults.17 In fact, 
some jurisdictions go so far as to sentence children to die behind 
bars with life without the possibility of parole as their prison term.18 
However, in the case of the latter, the Supreme Court recently 
announced the need to constitutionally temper such actions in light 
of modern scientific understandings of adolescence.19 
While seemingly disconnected, when taken together, these two 
frameworks—affirmative juvenile court requirements and criminal 
court restrictions—may offer some fundamental principles for the 
future of dealing with youth in conflict with the law.20 
A. Development and Deployment of Specialized Juvenile Courts 
United States juvenile courts have a complex and somewhat 
cyclical history.21 With the development of the first juvenile court in 
 
 14.  See MARK LIPSEY ET AL., IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 
PROGRAMS: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES 5 (Georgetown Ctr. for 
Juvenile Justice Reform, ed. 2010) (“Juvenile justice systems in the United States have long 
struggled with the inherent tension between their role in meting out punishment . . . [and] 
bringing about constructive behavior change.”). 
 15.  See infra Section I.A. 
 16.  See infra Section I.A. 
 17.  See infra Section I.B. 
 18.  See infra Section I.B. 
 19.  See infra Section I.C. 
 20.  See infra Section I.C. 
 21.  This is an account that is still very much being written, as formerly overlooked 
narratives and experiences, including those of youth of color, are finally being added to legal 
history’s annals. See, e.g., CHERYL D. HICKS, TALK WITH YOU LIKE A WOMAN: AFRICAN 
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1899 in Chicago, Illinois, the nation started down a path of 
embracing specialized venues for prosecuting kids accused of 
wrongdoing.22 Without any mandate from the United States 
Supreme Court, and over numerous constitutional challenges to the 
creation of such institutions,23 the juvenile court model spread across 
the country during the 1910s and the 1920s.24 By the middle of the 
last century, every jurisdiction had developed its own juvenile court 
system and juvenile code.25 
Our country’s juvenile courts were founded on the idea of in loco 
parentis, where the state sought to stand in the shoes of the child’s 
parent.26 From the outset, its architects sought to create a non-
punitive forum with less formal legal practices geared towards the 
 
AMERICAN WOMEN, JUSTICE, AND REFORM IN NEW YORK, 1890-1935 (Thadious M. Davis & 
Mary Kelley eds., 2010); Cheryl Nelson Butler, Blackness as Delinquency, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1335 (2013); see generally Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 
STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970) (challenging traditional historical accounts of juvenile courts and 
noting their implications). 
 22.  ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 
138–39 (40th anniversary ed. 2009) (describing the passage of the 1899 Illinois Juvenile 
Court Act and beginning of the nation’s juvenile court movement); Mae C. Quinn, Access to 
Justice: Evolving Standards in Juvenile Justice: From Gault to Graham and Beyond, 38 WASH. U. 
J. L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2012) (noting the first juvenile justice movement in this country began at 
the turn of the last century). 
 23.  See, e.g., Ex parte Daedler, 228 P. 467, 471 (Cal. 1924) (“[I]t may be stated that 
the almost universal trend of modern cases is in the direction of upholding the constitutionality 
of juvenile court laws as against assaults upon their validity.”); Piland v. Clark County Juvenile 
Court Services, 457 P.2d 523, 523 (Nev. 1969) (“The constitutionality of Juvenile Court laws 
has been sustained in over 40 jurisdictions against a variety of attacks.”); see also Emma O. 
Lundberg, The Juvenile Court as a Constructive Social Agency, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL WORK 155, 155  (1922) (“The past few years have 
witnessed in some quarters considerable opposition to the work of the juvenile court.”). 
 24.  PLATT, supra note 22, at 139; see also Emma O. Lundberg, Juvenile Courts—
Present and Future, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONGRESS OF THE AMERICAN PRISON 
ASSOCIATION 48, 48 (1921) (“Although every State but two has legislation authorizing the 
establishment of special juvenile courts or juvenile sessions, the juvenile court movement is still 
in a relatively primitive stage.”). 
 25.  PLATT, supra note 22, at 139 (“By 1928, all but two states had adopted a juvenile 
court system.”); Quinn, supra note 22, at 3 (“[T]reatment intervention through informality 
took hold in juvenile courts during the first half of the last century.”). 
 26.  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967) (describing in loco parentis as the “power of the 
state to act . . . for the purpose of protecting the property interests and the person of 
the child”). 
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needs of young people.27 For instance, they reportedly wished to 
remove kids from the public spectacle of the criminal courtroom and 
focus on rehabilitation over retribution.28 
Today, while every state has its own individual juvenile code and 
juvenile court structure, all generally consider the special interests of 
children who appear before them.29 For instance, juvenile courts 
assume that youth are still minors who have family and community 
connections.30 Parents and guardians are actual parties to 
proceedings where custody and other familial implications may be 
considered.31 In addition, most juvenile courts continue to provide 
some form of confidentiality and protection from the stigma of 
formal public findings.32 The vast majority of formally adjudicated 
 
 27.  Kristin Henning, Juvenile Justice After Graham v. Florida: Keeping Due Process, 
Autonomy, and Paternalism in Balance, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 17, 19–20 (2012) 
(describing the protective intuitions that drove the establishment of separate juvenile courts); 
see also PLATT, supra note 22, at 142–43 (noting how at the outset juvenile court judges were 
framed as “therapist[s]” working to understand and save children, rather than punish them). 
 28.  Christopher Slobogin, Treating Juveniles Like Juveniles: Getting Rid of Transfer and 
Expanded Adult Court Jurisdiction, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 103, 124 (2013) (“Given the 
traditional rehabilitative focus of the juvenile court, it stands to reason that the juvenile court 
system will have more to offer than the adult system in terms of treatment.”); see also PLATT,  
supra note 22, at 145 (“The passage of the Illinois juvenile court act in 1899 prompted a flood 
of optimistic rhetoric from child-saving organizations.”). 
 29.  See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-302 (1989) (requiring consideration of best 
interest of the juvenile before placement in state custody); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-100(5) 
(1979) (“[T]he best interests of the juvenile are of paramount consideration by the court.”); 
WIS. STAT. § 938.01(2)(f) (1995) (stating the purposes of Wisconsin Juvenile Code include 
responding to the best interest of the juvenile). 
 30.  Kristin Henning, It Takes a Lawyer to Raise a Child?: Allocating Responsibilities 
among Parents, Children, and Lawyers in Delinquency Cases, 6 NEV. L.J. 836, 839 (2006) 
(“Parental involvement is generally indispensable in the rehabilitative mission of the [juvenile] 
court and is often essential in helping children communicate with lawyers, make critical legal 
decisions, and achieve stated objectives in the juvenile case.”). 
 31.  See id.; see also, e.g., Common Questions About Juvenile Courts, ALA. COURT, 
http://juv.alacourt.gov/Cases/question.aspx (last visited Nov. 14, 2015) (“Parents or 
guardians of a child may be made parties in all juvenile court actions, which means that a 
parent or guardian may be required to pay attorney fees, fines, court costs, restitution and 
other costs and/or carry out certain activities which the court deems is in the best interest of 
the child . . . .”). 
 32.  See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.340(1)(a) (1986) (stating juvenile court 
records generally “shall be deemed confidential and shall not be disclosed” except to interested 
parties or for upon court order good cause); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2108 (2015) (describing 
which juvenile court records are open to public inspection and which are to be maintained in 
confidence); cf. Kristin Henning, Eroding Confidentiality in Delinquency Proceedings: Should 
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cases result in youth receiving treatment through social services, 
probation, and special youth placements, rather than fines, jail, or 
prison.33 And frequently they are informally resolved by way of 
youth-centered diversionary programs and practices, including 
warnings and dismissal.34 
Many have argued that juvenile courts are too informal and often 
entangle youth in a net of state control.35 The United States 
Supreme Court embraced such critiques when it declared in 1967 
that paternalism should not be used to justify arbitrariness or a lack 
of process in juvenile proceedings.36 Handing down In re Gault, the 
Supreme Court announced a right to representation, against self-
incrimination, and a baseline of notice and due process formality for 
youth-centered proceedings.37 Despite recognizing its failings and 
the need to strike a balance relating to state in loco parentis practices, 
the Court embraced the juvenile court model and acknowledged 
benefits to prosecuting kids outside of the adult criminal courts.38 
 
Schools and Public Housing Authorities Be Notified?, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520 (2004) (noting the 
various expanding exceptions to juvenile court confidentiality principles). 
 33.  See Tamar R. Birckhead, Delinquent by Reason of Poverty, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 53, 58 (2012) (noting that of 1.7 million juvenile court cases processed in 2008, over 
900,000 resulted in either informal adjustment services or formal supervision through 
probation). While some state juvenile courts may impose fines as part of case disposition, many 
states prohibit fines for children. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 211.181 (2005) (providing order 
for disposition or treatment); JOY COOK CARMICHAEL ET AL. 25 FLA. JUR. 2D FAMILY LAW § 
422 (2015) (“A trial court . . . has no power to impose a fine on a juvenile in a delinquency 
proceeding, or allow for imposition of only nominal fines.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-
131(5) (2014) (providing maximum fine of $50 for law violation). In addition, a parent or 
guardian is usually a party to such cases. See, e.g., E. BAY CMTY. LAW CTR., FINANCIAL COSTS 
FOR YOUTH AND THEIR FAMILIES IN THE ALAMEDA COUNTY JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: A 
GUIDE FOR ADVOCATES (2013), http://www.researchgate.net/publication/272242330. 
 34.  See MODELS FOR CHANGE, JUVENILE DIVERSION GUIDEBOOK (2011), 
http://www.modelsforchange.net/publications/301. 
 35.  See, e.g., Barbara Fedders, Losing the Guiding Hand: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
in Juvenile Delinquency Representation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 771, 784 (2010); Robin 
Walker Sterling, Fundamental Unfairness: In Re Gault and the Road Not Taken, 72 MD. L. 
REV. 607, 614–15 (2013); see also Birckhead, supra note 33, at 81 (describing phenomenon of 
adjudicating youth not based on culpability but perceived need). 
 36.  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 37.  Id. at 34; see also Mae C. Quinn, Giving Kids Their Due: Theorizing a Modern 
Fourteenth Amendment Framework for Juvenile Defense Representation, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2185, 
2190–91 (2014). 
 38.  See Gault, 387 U.S. at 79; see also Walker, supra note 35, at 643. 
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In offering this middle ground, many believe Gault did not go 
far enough in protecting kids, particularly youth of color who are 
vastly overrepresented in juvenile courts and corrections centers 
today.39 Many juvenile court systems currently face scrutiny for 
problematic practices.40 Despite these problems, few juvenile justice 
experts call for the abolition of juvenile courts.41 While such 
sentiments were shared by some stakeholders decades ago,42 today 
almost all youth advocates agree that it is preferable to have juveniles 
prosecuted in the juvenile court system rather than criminal courts, 
given the harsh sentencing alternatives and other stigmas kids face 
when prosecuted as adults.43 
Yet, as described further below, many youth in the United States 
are excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction each year. Serious 
youthful offender cases are frequently prosecuted in adult criminal 
courts and end with harsh prison terms.44 
B. Continued Practice of Prosecuting Kids in Criminal Courts 
Although the turn of the last century marked the beginning of 
the juvenile court movement, it did not end the practice of 
prosecuting kids in adult courts. Even after the Chicago Juvenile 
 
 39.  See, e.g., Fedders, supra note 35, at 784; Sterling, supra note 35, at 614–15. 
 40.  In fact, as this paper goes to press, Saint Louis County’s Family Court is 
contending with findings by the United States Department of Justice, alleging the court 
system fails to adequately protect the right to counsel, due process of law, or equal protection 
of the laws. See U.S. DEPT. JUST. C.R. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE ST. LOUIS COUNTY 
FAMILY COURT, ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI (2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ 
crt/legacy/2015/07/31/stlouis_findings_7-31-15.pdf. Some of the findings in that report 
relate to state-wide issues inherent in Missouri’s juvenile court structure. See id. at 53. 
However, others appear to reflect a need for the same kinds of practice and cultural changes 
called for in DOJ’s Ferguson Police Report. See supra note 7. 
 41.  See Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, 
and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68 (1997); see also Emily Buss, The 
Missed Opportunity in Gault, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 39, 46 (2003) (referencing Professor Feld’s 
continuing call for abolition). 
 42.  See Quinn, supra note 37, 2194–95 (2014) (recounting how various advocates and 
academics during the 1990s called for the abolition of juvenile court jurisdiction). 
 43.  See id. at 2194 n.43 (noting how Professor Marty Guggenheim changed course, 
initially calling for the end of juvenile courts and then retreated from this position); Martin 
Guggenheim, Graham v. Florida and a Juvenile’s Right to Age-Appropriate Sentencing, 47 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 457, 472 (2013) (noting fears of juvenile courts being abolished if 
advocates fight too hard for individual rights for youth). 
 44.  Guggenheim, supra note 43, at 473. 
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Court was established in 1899, its first presiding judge sent thirty-
seven youth to an adult grand jury for presentment.45 A tiered system 
of justice emerged where the most sympathetic youthful offenders 
were handled by the juvenile justice system, while those accused of 
the most serious crimes might still face adult prison time.46 
Moreover, no uniform rule was established for when a youth or her 
actions were so non-childlike that juvenile court was no longer an 
option,47 or how that determination should be made.48 
In 1954, this Janus-faced approach of dealing with kids in court, 
as well as the lack of uniformity around denial of juvenile court 
jurisdiction, led the New Jersey Supreme Court to lament “there 
remain . . . strongly conflicting opinions as to how juveniles should 
be dealt with in cases involving homicide and other heinous 
misconduct.”49 A decade later, the United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in Kent v. United States, a case involving a young 
person charged with sexual assault.50 However, the Court was not 
squarely presented with the issue of whether it was constitutional to 
try youth as adults. Instead, it was asked to review the transfer 
 
 45.  Fox, supra note 21, at 1187 n.29. 
 46.  Richard E. Zimring, The Punitive Necessity of Waiver, in THE CHANGING BORDERS 
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 207 (Jeffrey 
Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000) (“While juvenile court is the universal rule, every . . . 
jurisdiction has provided for exceptions to it.”). 
 47.  Robert O. Dawson, Judicial Waiver in Theory and Practice, in THE CHANGING 
BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 45 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2010) 
(providing overview of waiver laws across jurisdictions); David Pimentel, The Widening 
Maturity Gap: Trying and Punishing Juveniles as Adults in an Era of Extended Adolescence, 64 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 71, 86 (2013) (“State systems are all over the map as to which kids get 
routed into the adult criminal justice system.”). 
 48.  Today, even the names of the processes differ across jurisdictions. Depending on 
where a child lives, she might find herself facing charges in adult court because of processes 
referred to as transfer, waiver, certification, statutory exclusion, or direct file procedures. See 
Jenny E. Carroll, Rethinking the Constitutional Criminal Procedure of Juvenile Transfer 
Hearings: Apprendi, Adult Punishment, and Adult Process, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 175 (2009) 
(cataloging the range of terms used to bar a youth from receiving juvenile court treatment; the 
terms transfer, waiver, and certification are used interchangeably in this article). 
 49.  State v. Monahan, 104 A.2d 21, 27 (N.J. 1954). The court went on to describe the 
wide range of approaches—from courts that believed the more serious the crime, the more 
likely the need for the therapeutic intervention of the juvenile justice system, to those that held 
even pre-teens should receive the most serious sanctions available under the law for homicides. 
 50.  Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 543 (1966). 
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procedures provided by the District of Columbia and determine 
whether they were constitutionally adequate.51 
In reversing the criminal conviction of the teen in that matter, 
the Court noted the significance of a proceeding that could forever 
remove a child from the jurisdiction of juvenile court and warned 
that such a determination needed to be undertaken with great care.52 
Moreover, due process mandated meaningful assistance of counsel to 
defend a child against transfer to adult criminal court.53 
Over the next two decades, numerous challenges were brought 
seeking to prohibit youth from being tried as adults—some in cases 
where prosecutors had the ability by statute to “direct file” the cases 
of youths in adult courts without prior hearing.54 In these and other 
matters defense attorneys sought rulings that gave youth a 
constitutional right to, or at least a presumption of, juvenile court 
prosecution for alleged wrongdoings.55 But state and federal courts 
presented with these claims denied them.56 This, in turn, set the 
stage for the next wave in the nation’s juvenile justice movement—a 
 
 51.  Id. at 551–54. 
 52.  Id. at 554 (“We do not consider whether, on the merits, Kent should have been 
transferred; but there is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous 
consequences without ceremony—without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, 
without a statement of reasons.”). 
 53.  Id. at 554; see also Carroll, supra note 48 (describing Kent’s limited features 
and holding). 
 54.  See, e.g., Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 928–29 (Wyo.1984); State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 
390 (Utah 1989). 
 55.  See Lynda E. Frost Clausel & Richard J. Bonnie, Juvenile Justice on Appeal, in THE 
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL 
COURTS 181–206 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000) (describing challenges 
across the country during the 1980s and 1990s to statutory exclusion and other juvenile 
transfer practices). 
 56.  See e.g., People v. Jiles, 251 N.E.2d 529, 531 (Ill. 1969) (“While there would 
probably be almost universal agreement that it is desirable for a State to maintain a juvenile 
court . . . we are aware of nothing in the constitution of the United States or of this State that 
requires a State to do so.”); State v. Green, 544 P.2d 356, 361 (Kan. 1975) (“[T]he Kansas 
Legislature could, in the exercise of its wisdom, withhold the protection of the doctrine of 
parens patriae from all juveniles exceeding fifteen years of age.”); State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 
1361, 1363 (Fl. 1980) (finding no inherent or constitutional right to be treated as a juvenile); 
see also Woodard v. Wainright, 556 F.2d 781, 785 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[T]reatment as a juvenile 
is not an inherent right but one granted by the state legislature, therefore the legislature may 
restrict or qualify that right as it sees fit, as long as no arbitrary or discriminatory classification 
is involved.”). 
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sharp increase in the number of youth prosecuted and sentenced 
as adults. 
The practice of prosecuting children as miniature adult criminals 
became widespread during the 1980s and 90s.57 Communities and 
commentators fed panic around a reported rise in violent juvenile 
crimes. Thus a new teen “super-predator” narrative emerged—
primarily targeting youth of color.58 During the same period a range 
of new “tough on crime” laws and practices were used to drastically 
increase the number of juveniles tried in criminal courts and 
punished with long adult prison terms.59 Kids regularly received 
mandatory terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole during this period, and some were sentenced to execution.60 
At the end of the 1980s the United States Supreme Court took 
up two cases that challenged capital punishment for children. In the 
first, Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court overturned the death 
sentence of fifteen-year-old William Wayne Thompson for his role in 
a homicide, holding that it amounted to cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment because it was out of step 
with norms of a modern society.61 The very next year, however, it 
denied a similar claim for a two older teens in Stanford v. Kentucky.62 
 
 57.  Pimentel, supra note 47, at 86 (“In the 1980s and 1990s, there was an explosion of 
legislation across the country that expanded the laws, in almost every state, that allow juveniles 
to be tried as adults.”). 
 58.  Perry L. Moriearty & William Carson, Cognitive Warfare and Young Black Males in 
America, 15 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 281 (2012); see also Ashley Nellis, The Lives of Juvenile 
Lifers: Findings from a National Survey, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 5, 5–6 (2012), 
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/jj_The_Lives_of_Juvenile_Lifers.pdf 
(unpacking the racially-biased myth of the teen “super-predator” by noting that it arose while 
homicide rates for juvenile offenders was actually on the decline). 
 59.  Slobogin, supra note 28, at 104 (2013) (reporting that the number of youth under 
eighteen prosecuted as adults rose from approximately 15,000 a year in the 1970s to 250,000 
a year by 2007); Quinn, supra note 22, at 11 (“[T]he number of teens in adult correctional 
facilities rose from sixteen hundred in 1988, to over nine thousand in 1997.”). 
 60.  Nellis, supra note 58, at 6 (“[T]here was a steep rise in the number of teens who 
were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole during the mid-1990s.”); see also, e.g., 
Quinn, supra note 22, at 11–12 (describing how fifteen-year-old William Wayne Thompson 
received a death sentence in 1984 for his role in a homicide). 
 61.  Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
 62.  Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (Seventeen-year-old Heath Wilkins had 
been condemned to die in a Missouri court; Kevin Stanford, the Kentucky litigant, received a 
death sentence for a crime committed when sixteen). 
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Kids who kill at age sixteen and seventeen, the Court held, could be 
sentenced to die consistent with Eighth Amendment principles.63 
C. Legal Limits on Imposing Adult Sentences on Kids 
Shortly thereafter, juvenile justice organizations, sentencing 
reform groups, social scientists, and even government agencies began 
to more vigorously question the wisdom of extreme sentencing 
practices and policies for juveniles—a group that came to be more 
clearly defined as all youth under the age of eighteen.64 The work of 
these advocates laid the groundwork for a new litigation push that 
resulted in a range of restrictions on adult sentences for young 
people.65 Thus the start of this century, like the start of the last, saw a 
powerful movement to treat kids differently from adults and protect 
them from the harsh, sometimes life-and-death impact of 
criminal courts. 
In 2005, the United States Supreme Court reconsidered the 
question presented by Stanford—that is, whether the Eighth 
Amendment precludes imposition of the death sentences for all 
juveniles.66 Determining that standards of human decency had 
indeed evolved since 1989, the Court banned executions of all youth 
under the age of eighteen.67 Reaching this conclusion in Roper v. 
Simmons,68 the Court looked not only at legislative enactments and 
the direction of change in the law, but at emerging scientific 
opinions and international norms relating to adolescence.69 
 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  See, e.g., Patricia Allard & Malcolm Young, Prosecuting Juveniles in Adult Court: 
Perspectives for Policymakers and Practitioners, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (2002), 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/sl_prosecutingjuveniles.pdf (declaring 
“imposition of adult punishments, far from deterring crime, actually seems to produce an 
increase in criminal activity in comparison to the results obtained for children retained in the 
juvenile system”); see also Robert G. Schwartz, Age-Appropriate Charging and Sentencing, 27 
CRIM. JUST. 49, 49 (2012) (describing the MacArthur Foundation’s support in the 1990s for 
the Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, which produced 
numerous studies demonstrating reduced culpability on the part of youth). 
 65.  Nellis, supra note 58, at 6. 
 66.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 67.  Id. at 564–67, 578–79. 
 68.  Id. at 578–79. 
 69.  Id. at 568–78. 
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For instance, the Court relied heavily on the work of 
developmental psychologists like Jeffrey Arnett70 and Laurence 
Steinberg,71 as well as interdisciplinary juvenile justice experts like 
Elizabeth Scott.72 Their research supported the Court’s 
determination that youth are categorically different from adults in 
three key areas—(1) recklessness and risk taking, (2) susceptibility to 
peer pressure, and (3) amenability to change given their still 
developing characters. Such fundamental differences, the Court held, 
made traditional sentencing rationales largely irrelevant to children 
under the age of eighteen.73 It also excluded them from the group of 
people who could receive the most extreme sentences under law.74 
Five years later, the Supreme Court applied these factors and 
analyses to youth who were sentenced to die behind bars—but who 
had not actually killed or intended to kill another person.75 In 
Graham v. Florida the Court again cited emerging understandings of 
adolescence,76 including new medical findings about the still 
developing brains of youth.77 In doing so, it overturned the death-
 
 70.  Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior of Adolescents: A Developmental Perspective, 12 
DEV. REV. 339 (1992) (documenting the widespread nature of reckless risk taking during 
adolescence which diminishes as youth enter adulthood). 
 71.  Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: 
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. 
PSYCHOL. 1009 (2003) (psychologist and legal expert call for end of death penalty for youth 
given their immaturity and lack of moral development). 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70. 
 74.  Id. at 553. The Court further noted the rest of the world had abandoned such 
practices as being outdated and barbaric. Id. at 576. Other than Somalia, every country had 
outlawed the execution of children under the United Nation’s Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. Id. Such international norms also informed the Court’s independent judgment in 
determining that evolving standards of decency under the Eighth Amendment precluded death 
sentences for all juveniles under the age of eighteen—even for youth who committed 
homicidal acts. Id. at 578 (“[W]e acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international 
opinion against the juvenile death penalty, resting in large part on the understanding that the 
instability and emotional imbalance of young people may often be a factor in the crime.”). 
 75.  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 76.  Id. at 68. 
 77.  Id. (relying on opinions of amici, including the American Medical Association, 
which noted “parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through late 
adolescence”). The Court also relied upon international practices concerning youthful offender 
treatment and sentencing, which overwhelmingly outlawed life without parole for children. Id. 
at 80 (noting that when applying life without parole sentences to “juveniles who did not 
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behind-bars sentence of a seventeen-year-old who had committed an 
armed robbery.78 
The Court also held that—other than homicide cases where 
specific mens rea was demonstrated—life without parole sentences 
for juveniles were cruel, unusual, and constitutionally prohibited.79 
Such absolute terms did not sufficiently allow for the possibility of 
rehabilitation in individual cases.80 And, despite the Court’s long 
history of declaring “death is different” for purposes of Eighth 
Amendment analysis, it imposed a ban on a category of sentence for 
a category of defendants—juveniles—outside of the capital 
punishment context for the first time.81 
Thus, Graham may be seen as the start of a unique kind of 
constitutional analysis for defendants under the age of eighteen, even 
beyond the death penalty context—the evolving standards of youth 
doctrine.82 It created a class of litigants who deserve special attention 
in the realm of prosecution practices and policies, but it also 
acknowledged that our understanding of youth is transient and ever-
changing. Indeed, just two years later the Court applied this special 
approach to youthful offenders in another non-death penalty case, 
Miller v. Alabama, addressing the practice of mandatory juvenile life-
without-parole prison terms.83 
Here the Court offered new and nuanced reasoning to 
substantially amend the proportionality and evolving standards of 
 
commit homicide, the United States adheres to a sentencing practice rejected the 
world over”). 
 78.  Id. at 74. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. at 69 (“It follows that, when compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile 
offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability.”). 
 81.  Id. at 61 (applying Roper’s teachings although “here a sentencing practice itself is 
in question. This case implicates a particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class of 
offenders who have committed a range of crimes”). 
 82.  Quinn, supra note 22 at 12–16 (describing this “particularly noteworthy doctrinal 
shift” as reflecting a new wave in our country’s juvenile justice movements). Others have 
offered a slightly different take on this development, referring to it as the “children are 
different” doctrine. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, “Children are Different”: Constitutional Values 
and Justice Policy, 11 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 71, 73 (2013) (“The Court has created a 
special status for juveniles through doctrinal moves that had little precedent in its earlier 
Eighth Amendment cases.”); Robert Schwartz, supra note 64, at 49 (2012) (referring to the 
“tectonic shift” in juvenile justice in light of Roper, Graham, Miller and J.D.B.). 
 83.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
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decency doctrines as applied to youth—this time for kids who had 
killed, but had been mandatorily sentenced to life without parole.84 
Uniquely merging the teachings from Roper and Graham with 
another line of cases that prohibited death sentences in felony 
murder matters without an assessment of culpability,85 the Court 
prohibited automatic imposition of death behind bars penalties 
without an individualized sentencing hearing.86 Again noting 
emerging social scientific findings about the developing natures of 
juveniles,87 the Court issued a blanket prohibition against blanket 
sentences in juvenile homicide cases that do not take account of the 
differences between youth and adults.88 
D. Evolving Standards for Trying and Treating Youth 
Presented in this way, Supreme Court jurisprudence relating to 
accused youth appears to involve two distinct bodies of law: older 
cases that provide procedural rights in juvenile proceedings, and 
newer cases that provide substantive sentencing limits in adult court 
proceedings. As to the latter, just as occurred in the wake of Kent 
and Gault in the 1960s,89 many commentators have begun to 
consider their further implications.90 For instance, scholars like Cara 
Drinan and Marty Guggenheim have projected we will see more 
categorical bars on particular kinds of adult sentences for kids—such 
as life without parole or mandatory prison terms.91 At least one state 
high court—Iowa’s—has already jettisoned mandatory minimums 
 
 84.  Id. at 2463–75. 
 85.  See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 
586 (1978). 
 86.  Miller, 567 U.S. at 2460. 
 87.  Id. at 2464 (relying further on Steinberg, Scott, and the American Psychological 
Association). For whatever reason, the Court did not discuss international norms in the 
Miller  decision. 
 88.  Id.at 2460. 
 89.  See Quinn, supra note 37, at 2193 (recounting contemporary reactions to Gault 
which saw the decision as part of the due process revolution of the Warren Court). 
 90.  See generally Paul Litton, Symposium: Bombshell or Babystep? The Ramifications of 
Miller v. Alabama for Sentencing Law and Juvenile Crime Policy, 78 MO. L. REV. 1003 (2013) 
(describing symposium focusing on the legal implications of Miller). 
 91.  See Cara H. Drinan, The Miller Revolution, 101 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 
2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2475126; Guggenheim, supra note 43. 
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for youth based upon Miller’s analysis.92 Some lower courts are 
doing the same.93 
Others believe these cases require rethinking juvenile court 
practices. For instance, Elizabeth Scott has suggested Roper and its 
progeny may shape not only youth sentencing but also juvenile 
transfer practices.94 That is, “given that juveniles are presumptively 
less culpable than their adult counterparts, the decision about 
whether a particular youth will be tried as an adult should be made 
in a way that is compatible with constitutional values.”95 Scott 
believes that only the most serious felony matters should face the 
possibility of certification to criminal court and only after an 
individualized hearing to determine the appropriateness of such 
transfer in that particular case.96 Thus direct filing of youth under the 
age of eighteen into adult courts should be precluded. 
This Article argues that we might read the most recent Supreme 
Court pronouncements on juvenile sentencing together with older 
cases on juvenile court practices to address yet another area ripe for 
reform. Beyond portending new approaches for “deep end” juvenile 
prosecutions—serious felony cases where adult prison terms are 
possible—such an analysis supports reconsideration of minor 
municipal court matters that involve young people. This includes 
how cases of children are processed in local institutions like the 
Ferguson Municipal Court in St. Louis County, Missouri. 
II. AMERICAN MUNICIPAL COURT SYSTEMS 
Local municipal courts are both ubiquitous and invisible on the 
American legal landscape.97 Almost all community residents at some 
 
 92.  State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 2014); Grant Rodgers, Iowa Ruling Shifts 
from Mandatory Minimums for Juveniles, DES MOINES REG. (July 19, 2014, 12:39 AM CDT), 
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2014/07/18/iowa-ruling-shifts-from-
mandatory-minimums-for-juveniles/12833927/. 
 93.  See, e.g., State v. Smiley, Case No. 1331-CR04069 (Greene Co. Cir. Ct. Mo., Jan. 
6, 2015). 
 94.  Scott, supra note 82. 
 95.  Id. at 99. 
 96.  Id. at 99–100. 
 97.  I refer to courts of first resort that enforce local ordinance and code violations as 
“municipal courts.” But as will be further explained, such venues have different names in 
different places depending on the nature of the local government structure. They may be 
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point in their lives are likely to visit these institutions to deal with 
traffic infractions or local ordinance violations.98 Yet they have 
received little attention in modern legal scholarship.99 With the world 
watching events unfold in Ferguson, however, many are now 
beginning to ask questions about the appropriate role and reach of 
local governments—including their courts.100 
Some of these questions were posed in decades past.101 Indeed, 
just as juvenile courts have a somewhat cyclical and contested 
history, the same is true for local municipal courts in the United 
States. Their story has also vacillated between the thematic poles of 
autonomy and dependence. For these institutions, the ongoing 
inquiry has been whether local governments should be seen as 
independent free agents with broad discretion, or merely state 
subdivisions operating under limited license and in need of close 
monitoring and supervision. Youth have suffered as a result of the 
alternating commitments of juvenile justice policies in the country. 
Now, many are currently enduring hardships due to the municipal 
government pendulum, which has been permitted to swing too far in 
the direction of local autonomy over the state’s interests of 
supporting and protecting youth. 
 
known as city courts, traffic courts, police courts, village courts, mayor’s courts, justice of the 
peace courts, or by some other designation. 
 98.  Howard I. Kalodner, Note, Metropolitan Courts of First Instance, 70 HARV. L. REV. 
320, 320 (1956) (“Criminal courts of first instance constitute the only contact that most 
Americans ever have with the judiciary.”); Municipal Courts, CITY OF EL PASO, 
https://www.elpasotexas.gov/municipal-courts (last visited 20 Nov. 2015) (“The judges and 
staff of El Paso Municipal Court recognize that for most people their impression of the justice 
system is derived from their experience in municipal courts.”). 
 99.  Two notable and very thoughtful exceptions to this scholarly silence are Wayne A. 
Logan, The Shadow of Criminal Law of Municipal Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1409 (2001) 
and David M. Jaros, Preempting the Police, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1149 (2014). As will be further 
discussed below, while municipal courts have received little contemporary scholarly attention, 
in recent years press accounts and advocacy groups have begun to shed light on their practices. 
See William Glaberson, In Tiny Courts of N.Y., Abuses of Law and Power, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 
25, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/25/nyregion/25courts.html?page 
wanted=all; Hannah Rappleye & Lisa Riordan Seville, The Town That Turned Poverty into a 
Prison Sentence, THE NATION, (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/town-
turned-poverty-prison-sentence/. 
 100.  See Balko, supra note 8; Aaron Lewis, Don’t Shoot, DATELINE AUSTRALIA-SBS 
(Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.sbs.com.au/news/dateline/story/dont-shoot. 
 101.  See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Administration of Justice in the Modern City, 26 HARV. 
L. REV. 302, 310 (1913); T.E. Lauer, Prolegomenon to Municipal Court Reform in Missouri, 
31 MO. L. REV. 69 (1966). 
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A. Municipal Justice Generally 
Life in colonial America revolved around farm, family, and 
church, with parishes or townships growing up around these 
institutions.102 Over time, these units established their own forms of 
local government, including informal adjudicative systems to resolve 
disputes among neighbors and claims of wrongdoing in the 
community.103 Most localities borrowed from the English Crown’s 
historic practice of appointing peace keepers—or justices of the 
peace—for this purpose.104 And even as colonies reformed themselves 
as sovereign states, adopted state constitutions, and then ratified the 
federal Constitution, many colonial practices continued.105 
For instance, Georgia’s state constitution provided both state-
level superior courts and local-level inferior courts.106 The latter 
included courts presided over by justices of the peace with limited 
 
 102.  WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN 
IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 28 
(Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., 1973) (noting colonies encompassed “smaller units, 
called counties or districts” and these were further divided into “cities, towns, townships, and 
parishes”); see also Mae C. Quinn, From Turkey Trot to Twitter: Policing Puberty, Purity, and 
Sex-Positivity, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 51 (2014) (describing the role of church, 
family, and the home in early America). 
 103.  See ADAMS, supra note 102, at 4–6 (noting that while early America rejected the 
idea of a monarchy, its founders drew from English constitutional teachings); Chester H. 
Smith, Note, The Justice of the Peace System in the United States, 15 CAL. L. REV. 118, 118 
(1927) (noting that in colonial America, “the problem was to settle disputes among neighbors 
and to prevent friction where possible”). 
 104.  MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE 
ERA CHICAGO 7–10 (2003); see also History of Justices of the Peace, GOV’T S. AUSTRL. ATT’Y 
GEN. DEP’T (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.agd.sa.gov.au/government/about-us/ 
department/justice-peace-services/history-justices-peace (comparing justices of the peace to 
knights appointed by the King of England as peace keepers for unruly areas). 
 105.  EDWARD PEASE ALLINSON & BOIES PENROSE, PHILADELPHIA 1681–1887: A 
HISTORY OF MUNICIPAL DEVELOPMENT xiii-xliii (1887), http://www.archive.org/stream/ 
philadelphia168100alliuoft/philadelphia168100alliuoft_djvu.txt (describing shared 
governance at the birth of the country, with many seeing the local unit as the dominant 
concern); see also Paul Revelson, Nothing But Trouble: The Ohio Legislature’s Failed Attempts 
to Abolish Mayor’s Courts, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 223, 224–25 (2010) (explaining Ohio’s 
justice of peace courts, which existed through the 1800s, operated in small towns and handled 
civil matters for up to seventy dollars in damages, preliminary hearings for felony cases, and 
adjudications for minor criminal matters like affrays). 
 106.  Edward C. Brewer, III, The City Court of Atlanta and the 1983 Georgia 
Constitution: Is the Judicial Engine Souped Up or Blown Up?, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 941, 946–
47 nn.19 & 21 (1999). 
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adjudicative powers who passed judgment in cases “of conscience” 
or disputes about small sums of money.107 New Jersey’s first 
Constitution also established justice-of-the-peace courts that allowed 
for justices to be chosen through local elections and to preside over 
non-jury matters in community-based courts.108 
As the United States grew, however, so did local government.109 
Communities became less homogenous both in terms of their 
populations and their forms. Emerging industrial cities drew large 
and diverse populations at the turn of the last century.110 Suburbs 
also emerged.111 All of this presented challenges for previously parish-
based government thinking and structures. 
Some saw growth and modernization as an opportunity for 
greater professionalism in local government.112 Historically, justices 
of the peace received jobs as a result of political patronage or by 
offering special treatment to influential community members.113 
They were paid from fines and fees they were able to collect from 
litigants, raising questions about their objectivity.114 And most were 
not lawyers, law-trained, or schooled in legal ethics.115 
 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  John Morelli, Rising from the Chaos: A History of the Municipal Courts, 187 N.J. 
LAW. 8, 8–9 (1997). 
 109.  Smith, supra note 103, at 118 (“But today with paved roads, automobiles and 
instant communication . . . it is safe to say that the conditions which forced the creation and 
spread of the justice of the peace system in the United States have long since ceased to exist.”). 
 110.  Roscoe Pound, supra note 101, at 310 (“[O]ur common-law polity postulates an 
American farming community of the first half of the nineteenth century; a situation as far apart 
as the poles from what our legal system has had to meet in the endeavor to administer justice 
to great urban communities at the end of the nineteenth and in the twentieth century.”). 
 111.  Mark B. Feldman & Everett L. Jassy, Note, The Urban County: A Study of New 
Approaches to Local Government in Metropolitan Areas, 73 HARV. L. REV. 526, 526 (1960) 
(“[A] projection of population outward from the central city into suburban ‘dormitory 
communities’ has occurred concurrently with the familiar movement from rural areas into the 
central cities.”). 
 112.  See generally Pound, supra note 101 (lauding modernization of courts). 
 113.  Smith, supra note 103, at 121–22 (describing how local politics and influence 
impacted the work of justices of the peace). 
 114.  WILLRICH, supra note 104, at 9–10; see also Morelli, supra note 108, at 9 
(recounting critiques of justices of the peace in New Jersey, whose “compensation . . . 
depended in part on the penalties they assessed against defendants they found guilty of 
some offense”). 
 115.  Pound, supra note 101, at 305 (noting that during the 1800s “[a]dministration of 
justice by lay judges, by executive officers, and by legislatures was crude, unequal, and often 
partisan, if not corrupt”). 
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Others believed new kinds of local court systems were needed to 
deal with specialized issues presented by busy urban areas, shared 
spaces, and the “vices” allegedly created by city living.116 In 
particular, Progressive Era social reformers saw local criminal courts 
as a means of deploying more nuanced and humane decision-making 
to help solve family and community problems.117 It is perhaps no 
surprise, then, that Chicago—home of the first juvenile court in 
1899—served as one of the first sites for judicial innovation for adult 
defendants during the same era.118 This included specialized local 
dockets intended to address the “social issues” underlying specific 
criminal charges, such as family discord and mental illness.119 Thus, at 
about the same time as the launch of the juvenile court movement, 
the United States also saw a proliferation of local-level specialized 
courts for adults.120 
But while many supported such innovations, some claimed these 
experiments in justice created confusion, contributed to duplicative 
processes, and fostered disparities in case outcomes.121 New questions 
 
 116.  See id. at 311–12 (“Demand for socialization of law, in America, has come almost 
wholly if not entirely from the city” in light of needs to address housing congestion, sanitation, 
and protection of the vulnerable); see also Percy Stickney Grant, How To Put the People Behind 
the Law, N. AM. REV., Nov. 1911, at 699−709 (report outlining the ways in which law and 
legal institutions, including the courts, failed to account for turn-of-the-century developments 
such as tenement-house living, dangerous factory work, and immigration). 
 117.  See THE COMM. OF FIFTEEN, THE SOCIAL EVIL (Edwin R. A. Seligman ed., 2d ed. 
1912) (noting a reform group’s recommendations for improving legal processes relating to 
prostitution cases with a view towards curing the “social evil” of sex work and its implications); 
Bertha Rembaugh, Problems of the New York Night Court for Women, 2 WOMEN L.J. 45 
(1912) (urging new more therapeutic practices in the city’s night court for young women 
accused of prostitution). 
 118.  See WILLRICH supra note 104, at 6, 32, 96–127 (cataloging the ways in which 
Chicago’s city court system, with its own psychiatric unit, became one of the first in the 
country to attempt social engineering through mental health and other intervention 
for litigants). 
 119.  See generally id. 
 120.  See, e.g., Women Should Be Judged by Women, 4 WOMEN L.J. 45 (1915) (reporting 
on Georgia Bullock’s appointment to serve as the first judge in the Los Angeles Women’s 
Court, a special court for women defendants and juvenile cases, and calling for its replication); 
See Anna M. Kross & Harold M. Grossman, Magistrates’ Courts of the City of New York: 
History and Organization, 7 BROOK. L. REV. 133, 174 (1937) (noting that, in New York City, 
“[t]he first specialized court created by resolution was the Manhattan traffic court, on March 
2, 1916,” and that many more followed over the next few decades). 
 121.  Brewer, supra note 106, at 956−57 (recounting the fight to impose greater 
uniformity upon Atlanta’s city courts during the 1940s); Morelli, supra note 108, at 8 (“By 
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also arose about the source and extent of local government 
authority—including the power and expertise of local judges to get 
involved in complex matters of human behavior without sufficient 
support or training.122 More than this, in some urban areas, close 
relationships among local judges, police, and bondsmen resulted in 
new system dysfunctions, abuses of discretion, and wide-
spread corruption.123 
Ultimately, from the 1910s through the 1960s, waves of local 
court reform took place across the country.124 Some of these efforts 
sought to reduce confusion and increase uniformity, resulting in 
early problem-solving courts falling by the wayside.125 But some 
 
the early 20th century, the New Jersey judicial system was a confusing jumble of courts.”); see 
also Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 46 
J. AM. JUD. SOC. 55, 62 (1962) (noting the resulting “[m]ultiplicity” of courts is characteristic 
of archaic law”). 
 122.  See Kross & Grossman, supra note 120, at 133, 159 (recounting the results of the 
Page Commission study of 1910, which sought to bring greater professionalism to New York’s 
magistrates’ courts, but noting the return of problems in the 1930s); see also Morris Ploscowe, 
The Significance of Recent Investigations for the Criminal Law and Administration of Criminal 
Justice, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 823 (1952) (calling for greater oversight of local police 
activity to avoid unprofessional behaviors and more even-handed prosecution practices of 
crimes, like gambling, overlooked in some districts). 
 123.  See Mae C. Quinn, “Feminizing” Courts: Lay Volunteers and the Integration of 
Social Work in Progressive Reform, in FEMINIST LEGAL HISTORY 206, 208−09 (Tracy A. 
Thomas & Tracey Jean Boisseau eds., 2011) (describing the work of women lawyers and 
others who sought to rid New York’s magistrates’ courts of corrupt bondsmen who took 
advantage of poor women defendants in the 1910s); Aaron D. Simowitz, How Criminal Law 
Shapes Institutional Structures: A Case Study of American Prostitution, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
417, 434−35 (2013) (recounting how organized crime infiltrated New York City magistrates’ 
courts in the 1930s, including using designated bondsmen for alleged prostitutes working for 
the organization). 
 124.  Robert E. Allard, Court Reorganization Reform–1962, 46 J. AM. JUD. SOC. 110 
(1962) (cataloging differences in court reform efforts in seven different states); Alden Ames, 
The Origin and Jurisdiction of the Municipal Courts in California, 212 CAL. L. REV. 117, 
117−18 (1933) (outlining the goals of California’s 1924 constitutional amendments and the 
Municipal Courts Act); Revelson, supra note 105,  at 226 (noting that Ohio’s inferior court 
system underwent significant changes in 1910 with the “creation and growth of the 
municipal court”). 
 125.  Allard, supra note 124, at 110−14 (noting the differing motivations for reform of 
courts of first resort, including overlapping jurisdiction and inefficiencies); see generally Mae C. 
Quinn, The Modern Problem-Solving Court Movement: Domination of Discourse and Untold 
Stories of Criminal Justice Reform, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 57 (2009). 
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states also made way for even greater autonomy in local law making, 
law enforcement, and prosecution functions.126 
Under new “home rule” provisions,127 local entities—frequently 
referred to as municipalities—could establish themselves by way of 
incorporation or charter to run their own law making bodies and 
courts.128 Such localities were given a fair amount of independence—
with the law surrounding limits on their powers being developed as 
they were built.129 
Today the model municipal structure contemplates a local 
government with authority bounded by state law preemption 
principles.130 Generally, local legislatures can pass local laws relating 
only to the health and safety of their communities—such as local 
traffic provisions and basic rules of community engagement—that do 
 
 126.  See, e.g., George C. S. Benson, Joseph D. McGoldrick’s The Law and Practice of 
Municipal Home Rule 1916-1930, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (1934) (book review) (“[T]he 
power to establish courts is normally a state power, though California and Colorado 
constitutions specifically confer the power to create municipal and police courts upon cities.”); 
see also Feldman & Jassy, supra note 111 (describing the emergence and challenges of the 
“home rule” movement, fostering more formal local entities for purposes of governance 
and services). 
 127.  Note, Conflicts Between State Statutes and Municipal Ordinances, 72 HARV. L. REV. 
737, 738−39 (1959) (“Typical home-rule [constitutional] amendments provide that any 
community of a certain minimum size . . . may adopt a charter for its own government, which 
charter shall be submitted for approval to the voters of the community by referendum and 
then to the legislature or governor.”). 
 128.  See Ames, supra note 124, at 118 n.15 (“The word ‘municipal’ is most frequently 
defined as pertaining to a city or corporation having the right of local self-government.”) 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). An examination of all differences 
among local political structures—including the distinction between general and special 
localities—is beyond the scope of this paper. For more information on these topics, see 
generally Number of Municipal Governments & Population Distribution, NAT’L LEAGUE OF 
CITIES, http://www.nlc.org/build-skills-and-networks/resources/cities-101/city-
structures/number-of-municipal-governments-and-population-distribution (last visited Sept. 
19, 2015). 
 129.  Note, Judicial Inquiry into the Validity of a Municipal Ordinance, 14 YALE L.J. 
280, 281 (1905) (“[M]unicipal by-laws and ordinances are subject to investigation in the 
courts with a view to determining whether or not there has been an unwarranted interference 
with constitutional rights.”); Note, supra note 127, at 739 (“If a municipality acts beyond the 
authority granted it by the legislative enabling act or constitutional home-rule provision or 
charter adopted thereunder, the action is ultra vires and therefore invalid whether or not it 
conflicts with a state statute.”); see also Logan, supra note 99, at 1424 (noting the continuing 
contemporary tension between state preemption doctrine and local deference). 
 130.  Jaros, supra note 99, at 1152–53 (“Intrastate preemption occurs when state law 
precludes local governments from exercising their authority in a particular field.”). 
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not run contrary to state law.131 Local municipal executives, such as 
mayors, approve such laws and local police enforce them within the 
confines of geographic municipal boundaries by way of citation or 
arrest.132 Local judges, who are required to comply with state laws 
and apply constitutional due process principles, adjudicate alleged 
transgressions of local codes within municipal courts.133 
But in many parts of the country, serious questions about the 
efficacy, fairness, and integrity of local courts continue to this day.134 
And perhaps no local government and municipal court system has 
received more public attention than Ferguson—one of ninety small 
independent municipalities in St. Louis County, Missouri. 
B. St. Louis County Case Study 
Just over one million people live in Missouri’s St. Louis 
County.135 However, as highlighted in recently released advocacy 
 
 131.  Id. at 1169; see also Note, supra note 127, at 737, 739 (“When a municipality 
adopts a home-rule charter, and in some states even before the adoption of such a charter, it 
gains the right to enact ordinances governing a wide range of local and municipal affairs.”). 
 132.  See NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, supra note 128, (describing forms of local 
governments and municipalities as the predominant general form of local political structure); 
see also GA. MUN. ASS’N, HANDBOOK FOR GEORGIA MAYORS AND COUNCILMEMBERS 1, 1−2 
(2012), http://www.gmanet.com/GMASite/media/PDF/ 
handbook/handbook_complete.pdf. 
 133.  See, e.g., Morelli, supra note 108, at 9 (“The [New Jersey] Legislature abolished 
police, magistrate and recorder courts, and in their place authorized the establishment by 
ordinance of a municipal court or a joint municipal court with one or more other 
municipalities.”); Revelson, supra note 105, at 226 (noting that, in Ohio “[b]y 1951, with the 
passage of ‘a uniform law governing the powers and subject matter jurisdiction of municipal 
courts,’ nearly all police courts were replaced by municipal courts” but mayor’s courts 
remained in some areas). 
 134.  See, e.g., Kristina J. Bohn-Elia, Soundoff, ARIZ. ATTORNEY, May 2005, at 8 
(featuring a public defender weighing in on due process and right to counsel deprivations in 
Arizona’s municipal courts); Elizabeth A. Campbell & Tanya M. Marcum, Disbursement of 
Fines and Costs in Civil Infraction Cases, 80 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 345 (2003) (describing 
conflicts of interest and other issues existing in Michigan courts that process low-level civil 
infractions); Glaberson, supra note 99 (“[S]erious things happen in these little rooms all over 
New York State. People have been sent to jail without a guilty plea or a trial, or tossed from 
their homes without a proper proceeding.”). 
 135.  According to 2013 census data estimates, 1,001,444 people live in the County of 
St. Louis. See U.S. State and County Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/29/29189.html (last visited Sep. 20, 2015). 
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group reports,136 this population is spread across ninety different 
localities of vastly different sizes.137 Almost all localities are 
independently incorporated municipalities that run their own local 
governments, including legislative bodies, executive agencies, and 
courts.138 One of these municipalities is the town of Ferguson.139 
Ferguson has a population of about 21,000 people.140 Two-thirds 
of its residents are Black and more than one-third of the children live 
below the poverty line.141 Yet according to one study, last year the 
Ferguson Municipal Court handled approximately 12,000 municipal 
ordinance violation cases.142 With a Municipal Code comprised of 
hundreds of different provisions, potential charges run the gamut—
everything from littering and loitering to traffic violations.143 
Most cases start by way of citation or arrest. Notably, however, 
the Ferguson Police Department is ninety-four percent White while 
the community it serves is more than two-thirds Black, creating a 
high level of distrust and concern about racial bias.144 And, in fact, 
according to the state’s attorney general statistics, the agency has 
 
 136.  ArchCity Defenders is a non-profit legal services group that provides free direct 
representation in criminal and civil matters, while working to connect clients with housing and 
other social services. See ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, MUNICIPAL COURTS WHITE PAPER, 
http://www.archcitydefenders.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/ArchCity-Defenders-
Municipal-Courts-Whitepaper.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2015). Better Together is a project of 
the Missouri Council for a Better Economy, a grassroots, non-profit group interested in 
improving the economy and quality of life in the St. Louis area. See About Better Together, 
BETTER TOGETHER, http://www.bettertogetherstl.com/about (last visited Sept. 20, 2015). 
 137.  ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, supra note 136, at 4 (“St. Louis County is comprised of 
90 municipalities ranging in population from 12 to over 50,000.”); see also Public Safety – 
Municipal Courts, BETTER TOGETHER, (Oct. 2014), http://www.bettertogetherstl.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/BT-Municipal-Courts-Report-Full-Report1.pdf. 
 138.  BETTER TOGETHER, supra note 137, at 5 (noting that about eighty municipalities 
in St. Louis County run their own local court systems). 
 139.  See CITY OF FERGUSON, http://www.fergusoncity.com/ (last visited Sept. 
20, 2015). 
 140.  BETTER TOGETHER, supra note 137, at 30. 
 141.  ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, supra note 136, at nn. 67−71 and accompanying text. 
 142.  Id. at 31. 
 143.  FERGUSON, MO. CODE OF ORDINANCES, https://www.municode.com/library/ 
mo/ferguson/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTIICOOR (last visited Sept. 30, 2015). 
 144.  Rebecca Leber, Ferguson’s Police Force Is 94 Percent White—And That’s Basically 
Normal in the U.S., NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/ 
119070/michael-browns-death-leads-scrutiny-ferguson-white-police. 
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long engaged in racially disproportionate vehicle stops 
and investigations.145 
Generally, an individual cited for a municipal code violation was 
either arrested or instructed to come to court on a future date.146 If 
arrested, a defendant would be held until the court could see her to 
consider release or, alternatively, police might inform the accused of 
the amount of bail that could be posted to secure release.147 By way 
of example, during recent protests in Ferguson, citizens were 
arrested for failing to disperse and forced to post bail in amounts as 
high as $1,000 to secure pre-trial release for these civil ordinance 
violation matters.148 
Yet during this process of citation or arrest, court appearance, 
and possible sentencing, most defendants were not represented.149 
State public defenders do not offer services in these courts.150 And 
localities like Ferguson seldom provide court-appointed counsel for 
indigent defendants, claiming in part that municipal matters are 
merely low-level civil cases.151 Many run assembly-line-like court 
 
 145.  MISSOURI ATTORNEY GENERAL, MISSOURI TRAFFIC STOP REPORTS (2014), 
https://www.ago.mo.gov/home/vehicle-stops-report (reflecting significant 
overrepresentation of black drivers in Ferguson traffic stops for over a decade). 
 146.  Frances Robles, Mistrust Lingers as Ferguson Takes New Tack on Fines, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/us/mistrust-lingers-as-ferguson-
takes-new-tack-on-fines.html?_r=0. 
 147.  Julia Lurie & Katie Rose Quandt, How Many Ways Can the City of Ferguson Hit 
You with Court Fees? We Counted, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 12, 2014, 5:30 AM EDT), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/09/ferguson-might-have-break-its-habit-
hitting-poor-people-big-fines (“Ferguson Municipal Court is only in session three days a 
month, so if you can’t meet bail, you might sit in jail for days until the next court session.”). 
 148.  Rebecca Rivas, Lawyers Say High Bonds for Protestors are Unlawful and Unfair, ST. 
LOUIS AM. (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.stlamerican.com/news/local_news/article_ 
bdd62ee0-498c-11e4-8a3d-83313fda3102.html. 
 149.  Balko, supra note 8 (estimating that fewer than twenty-five percent of defendants in 
St. Louis County municipal courts are represented by counsel); ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, supra 
note 136, at 7 (“[I]n all but a very few, these municipalities fail to provide lawyers for those 
who cannot afford counsel.”). 
 150.  Frequently Asked Questions for Clients, MO. ST. PUB. DEF. (2004), 
http://www.publicdefender.mo.gov/clients/FAQ_clients.htm; see also Mo. Rev. Stat. § 
600.042.4 (2015) (“[D]efenders shall not be required to provide legal services to persons 
charged with violations of county or municipal ordinances, or misdemeanor offenses except as 
provided in this section.”). 
 151.  See, e.g., Your Rights In Municipal Court, LEE’S SUMMIT, MISSOURI MUNICIPAL 
COURT, http://cityofls.net/Municipal-Court/Court-process/Your-Rights-in-Municipal-
Court.aspx (last visited Sept. 30, 2015) (informing defendants of their “right to retain an 
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dockets,152 where hundreds of defendants might be summoned to 
court on any given night.153 Generally they were not provided with 
meaningful explanations of their options, advice about pleading 
guilty, or information about the collateral consequences that may 
flow from entering a plea—including the issuance of arrest warrants 
or possible loss of driving privileges.154 
In such systems, many municipal court defendants do not fully 
appreciate the consequences of failing to contest their charges. In 
fact, regardless of their civil designation for purposes of informal 
processes and lack of counsel, such matters frequently result in 
significant punitive and financial sanctions, including hefty “court 
fees” simply for being processed by the courts.155 And in many St. 
Louis municipal courts, pleading guilty has resulted in arrest and jail 
time when a defendant is unable to pay fines or complete conditions 
of probation, or does not appear for future case docketing.156 
But arrest, bail, and jail for civil violations, particularly when 
accompanied by deprivation of the right to counsel and punishment 
for poverty, is simply inconsistent with American constitutional 
values.157 The issue has not been squarely addressed by the United 
States Supreme Court,158 but most states agree civil infractions 
 
attorney” and where jail might be imposed “the Court will advise you to seek counsel”—but 
no mention of the right to court appointed attorneys). 
 152.  Baldasar v. Ilinois, 446 U.S. 222, 228 n.2 (1980) (Marshall, J. concurring) 
(referencing municipal court practices as providing “assembly-line” justice). 
 153.  Balko, supra note 8 (reporting on court being held on a basketball court in 
Florissant, Missouri in order to accommodate the volume). 
 154.  Even until recently the Ferguson City Website did not provide meaningful 
information about the court’s processes or the rights of persons charged there. In fact, the 
city’s court website was buried deep in part of the public safety and Ferguson Police 
Department webpages. See City Courts, CITY OF FERGUSON, http://www.fergusoncity.com/ 
60/The-City-Of-Ferguson-Municipal-Court (last visited Sept. 30, 2015); see also ARCHCITY 
DEFENDERS, supra note 136, at 7 (noting that “unrepresented defendants often enter pleas of 
guilty without knowing that they have the right to consult with a lawyer . . . [and] without a 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver” of their rights). 
 155.  See Lurie & Quandt, supra note 147. 
 156.  Balko, supra note 8. 
 157.  Rivas, supra note 148 (quoting this author as questioning the legality of arrests and 
bail conditions for civil violations and without provision of counsel). 
 158.  It also appears that the Missouri Supreme Court has yet to squarely address this 
issue in this context. Cf. Strode v. Director of Revenue, 724 S.W.2d 245 (Mo. 1987) (en banc) 
(challenging arrest unsuccessfully under a municipal ordinance based on conflicting state and 
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should not serve as grounds for arrest.159 In fact, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals recently reinstated a false arrest claim based on a 
San Francisco police officer’s action in taking an individual into 
custody for an alleged civil violation.160 And while the United States 
Supreme Court has upheld the ability to arrest for low-level, fine-
only traffic matters under the Fourth Amendment—that case, 
Atwater v. Lago Vista, involved alleged violations that were criminal 
in nature.161 
In fact, Missouri’s Criminal Code provides that state-level civil 
infractions are legally different from criminal charges.162 Missouri 
courts have repeatedly reiterated the same.163 To the extent the 
various Missouri statutes, rules, and local municipal codes conflict on 
the issue of whether arrest and jail may follow from a local civil 
 
local driving under the influence provisions; claim did not directly challenge law enforcement’s 
ability to arrest for civil municipal code violation in the first instance). 
 159.  See, e.g., Civil Motor Vehicle Infractions FAQ, MASS. COURT SYS. (2015), 
http://www.mass.gov/courts/selfhelp/tickets/cmvi-faq.html (explaining that mere civil 
traffic violations, if ignored, result in civil penalties like suspension of driving privileges and 
that criminal traffic violations can result in the criminal sanction of arrest); Traffic and 
Nontraffic Civil Infraction Matters, MICH. COURTS., http://courts.mi.gov/self-
help/center/casetype/pages/infraction.aspx (last visited Sept. 30, 2015) (“A person cannot 
be sent to jail for a civil infraction unless they are found to be in civil contempt.”); Types of 
Traffic Offenses, HAW. STATE JUDICIARY, (2008), http://www.courts.state.hi.us/self-
help/traffic/types_of_violations.html (describing the difference between criminal traffic 
infractions, which allow for arrest and incarceration, and civil traffic infractions which do not). 
 160.  Edgerly v. San Francisco, 713 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that arrest for 
California civil infraction could provide grounds for false arrest claim); cf. Virginia v. Moore, 
553 U.S. 164 (2008) (upholding mistaken arrest for citation-only misdemeanor crime). Note 
further that in Moore the Court upheld an officer’s search incident to arrest following a cite-
only traffic offense. But the case presented the issue of a single officer, in a single case, making 
a single error—not a standing practice of arrest for civil law violations. 
 161.  532 U.S. 218 (2001) (noting the charges were brought under a state statute that 
classified the actions as misdemeanors); see also Moore, 553 U.S. 164; Charlie Gerstein & JJ 
Prescott, Process Costs and Police Discretion, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 268, 284 (2015), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2543945 (calling for a move towards civil enforcement of low-level, 
quality of life offenses, which the authors argue could involve “only very brief detentions” of 
no more than twenty-four hours). 
 162.  See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 556.021.1 (2014) (“An infraction does not constitute a 
criminal offense and conviction of an infraction shall not give rise to any disability or legal 
disadvantage based on conviction of a criminal offense.”). 
 163.  See, e.g., City of Cameron v. Stinson, 633 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) 
(“[P]rosecutions for the violation of a municipal ordinance are civil and not criminal 
proceedings in the constitutional sense” but “have certain quasi-criminal aspects.”); see also 
State ex rel. Estill v. Iannone, 687 S.W.2d 172 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). 
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charge,164 they should be found either to be unconstitutionally 
vague165 or read in favor of the accused.166 The St. Louis county 
municipal practice of taking people into custody—and in some 
instances denying bail—for alleged civil municipal violations, stands 
in stark contrast to long understood United States legal norms. 
Second, as the United States Supreme Court decided more than 
ten years ago in Alabama v. Shelton,167 defendants facing suspended 
jail time are entitled to appointment of counsel. The provision of 
counsel is clearly compelled in probation cases, where jail may result 
for failure to successfully complete conditions.168 But municipal court 
proceedings, where defendants face arrest or jail for failing to satisfy 
fees and fines, should similarly trigger Shelton right to counsel 
rules.169 No matter how these practices might be framed locally, they 
are tantamount to the suspended jail time contemplated by Shelton. 
Here, too, St. Louis County municipal court practices largely 
disregard constitutional representation principles. 
Third, incarceration based on indigence is akin to debtors’ prison 
practices abandoned long ago. In a series of cases decided in the 
1970s and 1980s, the United States Supreme Court held that courts 
may not imprison defendants for failing to satisfy financial sanctions 
without first determining whether the failure was willful.170 Such 
 
 164.  See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 544.216 (2014) (stating Missouri law enforcement 
officers may effectuate an arrest based on violations of state criminal laws, state law infractions, 
or municipal ordinance violations). 
 165.  See, e.g., Christina D. Lockwood, Defining Indefiniteness: Suggested Revisions to the 
Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 8 CARDOZO PUB. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 255, 257–58 (2010) 
(noting vagueness doctrine is traditionally triggered when laws are “standardless” or allow for 
“seriously discriminatory enforcement” but calling for even broader allowance of the 
doctrine’s application). 
 166.  See Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 
885, 889 (2004) (calling the rule of lenity a “meta” rule); see also Damon v. City of Kansas 
City, 419 S.W.3d 162, 168 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (stating in Kansas City municipal summons 
documents that defendant was required to plead “guilty” or “not guilty” and further including 
a threat of warrant and arrest are inconsistent with civil violation practices). 
 167.  535 U.S. 654 (2002). 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id.; see also Erica Hashimoto, Abandoning Misdemeanor Defendants, 25 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 103, 103 (2012) (reporting that while the “suspended sentence” standard should 
have vastly increased the number of cases in which attorneys are provided, in fact the number 
has decreased post-Shelton). 
 170.  See generally Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983) (explaining that probation 
may not be revoked based on failure to pay a fine and restitution absent a determination that 
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willfulness cannot be found where an individual is simply too poor to 
pay the amount ordered.171 Codified state law in Missouri recognizes 
the same.172 In fact, Missouri law suggests that civil default judgment 
is the appropriate remedy when a defendant fails to pay fines, fees, or 
costs in conjunction with a state-level civil infraction.173 
Yet practices of civil arrest, pro se defense, and jail punishments 
for poverty have persisted for years in Ferguson and other St. Louis 
County local courts.174 In one recent year, Ferguson alone issued 
over 20,000 arrest warrants175 Most warrants stemmed from cases 
where there was no lawyer, no meaningful legal advice provided 
before plea, and no assessment of the individual’s ability to pay 
imposed fines and fees.176 
Much of this has been driven by a desire to collect as much 
money as possible for local coffers. In fact, St. Louis municipalities 
ambitiously forecast future prosecution revenues each year.177 And as 
property values in poorer areas like Ferguson have fallen, reliance on 
court-generated income has increased.178 While it cost only $313,192 
to operate the Ferguson municipal court system last year, it pulled in 
more than $1.8 million through financial sanctions and sentences.179 
Commentators have noted that municipal court fines, fees, and costs 
serve as a “hidden tax” that disproportionately impacts communities 
 
the non-payment was willful and not based on indigence); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) 
(prohibiting jail of a poor defendant for failure to pay a fine); Williams v. Illinois, 400 U.S. 235 
(1970) (finding that punishment based on indigence improper). 
 171.  See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668. 
 172.  See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 560.026 (2014) (Imposition of Fines), 560.031 (Response 
to Non-Payment); see also id. at § 479.260 (“[T]he judge may assess costs against the 
defendant except in those cases where the defendant is found by the judge to be indigent and 
unable to pay the costs.”). 
 173.  Id. at § 556.021.1(3). 
 174.  Jeremy Kohler et al., Municipal Courts Are Well-Oiled Money Machine, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 15, 2015, http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/ 
municipal-courts-are-well-oiled-money-machine/article_2f45bafb-6e0d-5e9e-8fe1-
0ab9a794fcdc.html (“People who can’t afford lawyers are stuck with answering to the original 
charge, and sometimes end up in jail if they miss court appearances because they cannot pay.”). 
 175.  ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, supra note 136, at 34, nn.73–74 and accompanying text. 
 176.  See id. 
 177.  BETTER TOGETHER, supra note 136, at 2 (describing how some municipalities 
“actually budget for increases in fines and fees”). 
 178.  Id. (“[R]esearch revealed that fines-and-fees revenue increased at a time when 
property-tax revenue declined.”). 
 179.  Id. at 27, tbl.6. 
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of color and the most economically challenged individuals in the St. 
Louis region.180 
After decades of such problems,181 government and community 
advocates are finally beginning to take action and call for reform of 
these practices. For instance, in November 2014, Missouri’s 
Governor appointed a sixteen-member commission to conduct “a 
thorough, wide-ranging and unflinching study of the social and 
economic conditions that impede progress, equality and safety in the 
St. Louis region.”182 In December 2014, Missouri’s attorney general 
filed suit against several municipalities who appeared to be collecting 
more fines and fees than permitted by state law.183 
In 2015, several local advocacy groups filed their own legal 
actions, successfully challenging and changing various municipal 
court debtors’ prison practices in Ferguson and neighboring 
towns.184 And the Missouri Legislature passed Senate Bill 5, a multi-
faceted and much celebrated piece of legislation, which seeks to 
 
 180.  Id. at 2 (“The practice of using fines and fees to impose ‘hidden taxes’ on the 
poorest populations is evident.”). 
 181.  Indeed, many of these issues were addressed in a law review article published in the 
1960s, and local attorneys have been operating in these courts for decades. See Lauer, supra 
note 101. 
 182.  Jay Nixon, Executive Order 14-15, OFF. MO. GOVERNOR (Nov. 18, 2014), 
https://governor.mo.gov/news/executive-orders/executive-order-14-15. As this article goes 
to press, it remains to be seen what will become of the Commission’s various advisory findings. 
For more about Governor Jay Nixon’s “Ferguson Commission,” see The Process So Far, STL 
POSITIVE CHANGE, http://stlpositivechange.org/commission-work (last visited Sept. 
30, 2015). 
 183.  See Mariah Stewart, Missouri Attorney General Sues Municipalities Over “Predatory” 
Traffic Fines, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/ 
12/18/missouri-traffic-fines-lawsuit_n_6350634.html. These suits were ultimately dismissed, 
in part because of legislative reforms adopted in Senate Bill 5. See infra note 187. 
 184.  See, e.g., Monica Davey, Ferguson One of 2 Suburbs Sued over Gauntlet of Traffic 
Fines and Jail, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/09/us/ 
ferguson-one-of-2-missouri-suburbs-sued-over-gantlet-of-traffic-fines-and-jail.html. These 
successful lawsuits and related settlements have focused on jail conditions, money bail issues, 
and incarceration based on poverty. See, e.g., Jeremy Kohler, Municipal Courts Make Major 
Changes before New Law Takes Effect, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 28, 2015), 
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/municipal-courts-make-major-
changes-before-new-law-takes-effect/article_480a7d9d-6006-5efc-8521-02ec0d0d3743.html. 
Interestingly, to date no suit has squarely challenged the constitutionality of: (1) arrest or 
detention practices relating to mere civil violations; or (2) disregard for Shelton when jail 
follows conditional discharge violations. 
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address some of the harsh municipal court practices 
outlined above.185 
III. MINORS IN MUNICIPAL COURTS—FORGOTTEN IN FERGUSON 
AND BEYOND 
These emerging critiques and challenges to local policing and 
prosecution practices in St. Louis County are historic and 
important.186 And many important changes appear to be underway. 
Remarkably, however, most of these efforts, accounts, and reforms 
have largely overlooked one especially vulnerable group harmed by 
municipal court practices—children.187 
Fortunately, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) in 
its investigation of Ferguson shed further light on this issue.188 The 
DOJ’s well-publicized March 2015 report recounted numerous 
instances of local children enduring the same racially biased, 
inhumane, and abusive municipal policing practices that were visited 
on adults.189 And after hearing testimony from this author, impacted 
 
 185.  Robert Patrick & Stephen Deere, “Sweeping” Court Reform Comes as Nixon Signs 
Bill to Cap Cities’ Revenue, End Predatory Habits, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (July 10, 2015), 
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/sweeping-court-reform-comes-as-
nixon-signs-bill-to-cap/article_cafffb7e-b24d-5292-b7bb-84ef81c6e81d.html. 
 186.  William H. Freivogel, Missouri Supreme Court Eases Penalty for Not Paying Court 
Fines, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Jan. 6, 2015), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/missouri-
supreme-court-eases-penalty-not-paying-court-fines (reporting a change in a municipal court 
rule which will require courts to consider indigence in conjunction with fines, which is only 
partially response to complaints and will not take effect until summer); see also Editorial Board, 
Editorial, Reforms Follow Protests in Ferguson, N.Y TIMES, Sept. 7, 2015, at A16 (“It is no 
small achievement that Missouri began enforcing a series of tough new court reforms last 
month aimed at ending one particularly flagrant abuse: the systematic fleecing of accused 
traffic offenders in a revenue scheme to bolster the budgets of local governments.”). 
 187.  See, e.g., William Freivogel, Two Visions of Municipal Court Reform, ST. LOUIS PUB. 
RADIO (Nov. 12, 2014), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/two-visions-municipal-court-
reform (reflecting that no groups calling for municipal court reforms have mentioned the 
impact of court practices on kids as litigants, or the possibility of redirecting youth from the 
reach of such courts); see also Mike Lear, Washington University Professor Wants Missouri 
Juvenile Court Reforms, MISSOURINET (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.missourinet.com/ 
2015/08/17/washington-university-professor-wants-missouri-juvenile-court-reforms/ 
(recounting this author’s critiques of Senate Bill 5, including its failure to specifically account 
for kids in municipal courts). 
 188.  INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 7. 
 189.  Id.; see also Mae C. Quinn, Robbed of Childhood and Chances—Ferguson and 
Beyond, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.stltoday.com/news/ 
opinion/robbed-of-childhood-and-chances-ferguson-and-beyond/article_7d5cdd2f-1e3b-
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youth, and other community members,190 the Governor’s Ferguson 
Commission has turned its attention to the issue of minors in 
municipal courts.191 
Indeed, each year in St. Louis—and across the country—
countless young people are forced to contend with the myriad 
municipal court problems outlined above. As described throughout 
the next section, these issues take on heightened legal and 
constitutional significance when visited on juveniles.192 
A. Missouri’s “Shadow” Juvenile Justice System193 
In Missouri, juvenile courts were created at the turn of the last 
century to provide intervention and assistance for youth in conflict 
with the law.194 Joining the Progressive Era’s movement, Missouri 
lawmakers saw value in removing children from the harsh setting and 
consequences of criminal courts.195 The 1905 Juvenile Courts Act 
clearly embraced protective in loco parentis thinking, specifically 
providing that “care, custody and discipline of the child” in Juvenile 
 
5e40-b95a-68fcf6bba77f.html (describing in part how DOJ’s Ferguson Report should be read 
as surfacing the region’s “shadow” juvenile justice systems operating in the shadows of 
constitutional and state law). 
 190.  See, e.g., Jason Rosenbaum, Ferguson Commission Eyes Overhaul of Region’s 
Municipal Courts, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Dec. 16, 2014), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/ 
post/ferguson-commission-eyes-overhaul-regions-municipal-courts. 
 191.  See, e.g., Jennifer Mann, Ferguson Commission Seeks Complete Overhaul, Shrinking of 
Municipal Courts, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June 23, 2015), http://www.stltoday.com/ 
news/local/crime-and-courts/ferguson-commission-seeks-complete-overhaul-shrinking-of-
municipal-courts/article_14b97058-ac3f-537d-9616-1378ed0e0cae.html (referencing 
proposal of limited right to counsel for juveniles in municipal courts). Again, as this article 
goes to press, this group’s efforts are still very much in progress and advisory in nature. See 
supra note 136. 
 192.  Again, throughout this Article I generally use the terms “minor” and “juvenile” 
interchangeably to refer to youth under the age of eighteen. 
 193.  See Elizabeth A. Angelone, Comment, The Texas Two-Step: The Criminalization of 
Truancy Under the Texas “Failure to Attend” Statute, 13 SCHOLAR 433, 452 (2010) (referring 
to Texas’s “shadow juvenile justice system” in local municipal courts). 
 194.  MO. JUV. JUST. ASS’N, CELEBRATING 100 YEARS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN 
MISSOURI: 1903-2003 1 (2003), http://www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/100years.pdf 
(describing enabling legislation for Missouri’s first juvenile courts—established in 1903 in St. 
Louis and Jackson County). 
 195.  See generally Noah Weinstein, The Juvenile Court Concept in Missouri: Its Historical 
Development—The Need for New Legislation, 1957 WASH. U. L. Q. 17, 31 (1957) [hereinafter 
Weinstein, Historical Development]. 
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Court “shall approximate as nearly as may be that which should be 
given by its parents . . . .”196 The Act went on to explain: “[A]s far as 
practicable any delinquent child shall be treated, not as a criminal, 
but as misdirected and misguided, and needing aid, encouragement, 
help and assistance.”197 
Since 1905, the term “child” has been defined, for juvenile 
delinquency purposes as someone under the age of seventeen.198 
Missouri was and is an outlier. In 1959 when the possibility of 
raising the age of juvenile court jurisdiction was considered as part of 
the current “modern” Juvenile Code, Missouri declined to embrace 
the change.199  
At that time, thirty-one other states had already raised the age to 
eighteen.200 Today, forty states provide that for purposes of 
prosecution, juvenile court jurisdiction extends until a young person 
turns eighteen.201 And, as already discussed, eighteen is the 
constitutional cut-off for purposes of juvenile status.202 Nevertheless, 
seventeen-year-olds in Missouri continue to have their municipal 
ordinance cases “direct filed” into municipal courts for processing 
and prosecution.203  
More than this, children as young as fifteen are now charged in 
Missouri’s municipal courts for some local offenses.204 However, 
 
 196.  Id. at 31. 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Id. at 22. The 1903 Juvenile Courts Act provided for original jurisdiction for all 
accused youth under the age of sixteen. Id. at 26. Two years later the Act was amended to 
extend juvenile court prosecution to sixteen-year-old youth—but not seventeen-year-olds. Id. 
at 30. 
 199.  Noah Weinstein & Lee N. Robins, The Juvenile Court in Missouri: 1957-59—A 
Survey of Current Developments and Future Requirements, 1959 WASH. U. L. Q. 373, 
374 (1959). 
 200.  In 1959, Missouri’s “modern” Juvenile Court’s Act was passed, rejecting a proposal 
to raise the age of jurisdiction to eighteen and instead retaining seventeen as the cut-off. Id. 
 201.  JEFFREY A. BUTTS & JOHN K. ROMAN, LINE DRAWING: RAISING THE MINIMUM 
AGE OF CRIMINAL COURT JURISDICTION IN NEW YORK 5 (2014); see also Weinstein & 
Robins, supra note 199, at 374. Last year the Missouri Legislature finally reconsidered this 
dated position. Senator Wayne Wallingford, a Republican, has introduced Senate Bill 213, 
seeking to raise the age of juvenile court jurisdiction to eighteen. S. Bill 213, 98th Gen. 
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo.  2015), https://legiscan.com/MO/text/SB213/2015. 
 202.  See supra Section I.C. 
 203.  And, of course, they are also “direct filed” into our adult criminal court system for 
alleged violations of state criminal laws. 
 204.  MO. REV. STAT. § 211.031.1(3) (2014). 
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allowing fifteen and sixteen year olds to be prosecuted in municipal 
courts is out of step with historical practices in Missouri.  For 
instance, at the turn of the last century, even minor local infractions 
were directed to specialized juvenile courts for evaluation.205 And, at 
least up through the mid-1960s, most alleged child traffic matters 
were directed away from local municipal courts and into specialized 
juvenile courts for review.206 Juvenile court staff handled such issues 
as age-appropriate indiscretions on the part of children.207 For 
instance, in 1965, St. Louis County’s Juvenile Court dismissed the 
vast majority of such cases—nearly 1000 in all—after providing a 
warning or some low-level informal intervention intended to educate 
and redirect the child from future violations.208 
Yet Missouri’s current Juvenile Code now precludes juvenile 
court treatment for anyone fifteen years of age or older “who is 
alleged to have violated a state or municipal traffic ordinance.”209 All 
such matters are handled exclusively by municipal court judges.210 
Other local matters, including curfew prosecutions, also may be filed 
directly in municipal courts.211 
 
 205.  Weinstein, supra note 195, at 23–30; see also Kalodner, supra note 98, at 340 
(stating how in 1956, one commentator noted that the “[p]roblems of juvenile delinquency in 
cases of defendants under the age of sixteen almost never fall within the jurisdiction of criminal 
courts of first instance”). 
 206.  Weinstein, supra note 195, at 22. 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  Id. at 37. 
 209.  See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.031.1 (2)(3). This reflects a change from just a few years 
ago, where the cut-off for municipal prosecution of children was fifteen and one-half years old. 
See H.B.1171, 145th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012) (reducing municipal court 
jurisdiction from age fifteen and one-half to fifteen beginning in 2013 for traffic cases). 
Interestingly, the bill was sent to committee with a note suggesting that without such change, 
minor traffic offenders were not otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of courts. See COMM. ON 
JUDICIARY, H.B. 1171 COMMITTEE BILL SUMMARY, 145th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 
2012), http://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills121/sumpdf/HB1171C.pdf. In fact, 
such cases could have simply remained under state juvenile court jurisdiction. Other legislative 
materials erroneously suggested that the law actually expanded juvenile court jurisdiction over 
such matters—rather than restricting it. See, e.g., SENATE STAFF, CURRENT BILL SUMMARY 
H.B. 1171, 145th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012), http://www.senate.mo.gov/ 
12info/BTS_Web/Bill.aspx?SessionType=R&BillID=107149; see also COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 
H.B. 1171 PERFECTED BILL SUMMARY, 145th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012), 
http://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills121/sumpdf/HB1171P.pdf. 
 210.  Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.031.1(2)–(3) (2014). 
 211.  Id. (describing Missouri’s concurrent jurisdiction arrangement for curfew cases). 
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It is clear that seventeen-year-old children in Missouri have been 
arrested, asked to post bail, faced accusation in public court settings, 
and received sanctions and punishment, all without any specialized 
legal treatment or required appearance of a supportive adult. In 
some instances, parents have been turned away at the courthouse 
doors and told they are not allowed to accompany their seventeen-
year-old children to see the judge.212 Despite the United States 
Supreme Court’s repeated pronouncements that youth are part of a 
special category for prosecution purposes up until age eighteen, 
Missouri has ignored this constitutional cut-off. 
As for fifteen- and sixteen-year-olds, it is not entirely clear how 
they are being handled in Missouri municipal courts. As noted 
above, municipal courts see themselves as having concurrent 
jurisdiction with juvenile courts in some of these child defendant 
matters—and exclusive jurisdiction in others. But Missouri’s 
Municipal Code does not require special court treatment for these 
children—such as confidentiality, appointment of counsel, or waiver 
of fines or costs based on minority. Nor does Missouri law expressly 
preclude the issuance of bench warrants for fifteen- and sixteen-year-
old children for failure to make timely payments of fines and fees.213 
Similarly, while the Missouri Juvenile Code states that youth 
under the age of seventeen should not be held in local jails,214 it does 
not expressly prohibit public arrest, transport in handcuffs, or 
extended stays in juvenile detention centers for purposes of return on 
municipal court bench warrants in traffic or other civil matters.  
Yet these cases often stem from nothing more than normal 
youthful indiscretions. Parents may be uninformed about the 
prosecutions.215  And, as recently reported by national media, many 
 
 212.  This author has witnessed this phenomenon—where parents have been told they 
are not permitted to join their teenage children in the courtroom, but must instead wait 
outside for the child to exit. This author has heard from other advocates about court staff 
precluding parents of even young teens from entering the courtroom. Conversation with St. 
Louis clinic colleagues, July 2015. 
 213.  See generally e.g., MO. SUP. CT. R. 37.47. (2004). 
 214.  See MO. REV. STAT. § 211.033(1) (2014) (“No person under the age of seventeen 
years, except those transferred to the court of general jurisdiction under the provisions of 
section 211.071 shall be detained in a jail or other adult detention facility as that term is 
defined in section 211.151.”). 
  215.  In fact, during a recent Ferguson City Council Meeting one parent testified that 
she did not even know about the traffic tickets, fines, and fees that had been imposed on her 
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at-risk teens may be negotiating these punitive processes entirely on 
their own.216 But Missouri is not alone in its ongoing arrangement of 
running municipal courts without specialized protections or 
concerns for youthful litigants. Several other states have their own 
shadow juvenile justice systems that present similarly problematic 
pictures of local courts failing to account for youthful vulnerabilities. 
B. Invisible Juvenile Justice Systems in Other States 
1. Wyoming 
Wyoming has created a juvenile justice system rife with 
“loopholes” that allow child defendants to face charges in municipal 
courts without any prior certification hearing.217 This is because for 
nearly every alleged law violation—whether it is a state crime or a 
municipal ordinance violation—the prosecution has the power to 
elect to charge the child outside of the juvenile court setting.218 
Thus, youth may have their cases directly filed into juvenile, circuit, 
or local municipal courts without any concern for their status 
as minors.219 
According to critics, historically these decisions have been driven 
by the leanings of local police and prosecutors.220 They have also 
resulted in fewer than twenty percent of accused children being 
 
teen sons until well after the fact. See Mae C. Quinn, Open Letter to Mayor of Ferguson: 
Amnesty Would Make Amends, ST. LOUIS AM. (Sept. 24, 2014), 
http://www.stlamerican.com/news/columnists/guest_columnists/article_8b705cd2-4414-
11e4-b812-5fdfef440f5c.html. 
 216.  See Seth Freed Wessler & Lisa Riordan Seville, Kids in Court: Is it Time to Raise the 
Age for Criminal Responsibility?, NBC NEWS (Jan. 20, 2015, 11:40 AM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/in-plain-sight/kids-court-it-time-raise-age-criminal-
responsibility-n289566; see also Quinn, supra note 215. 
 217.  Donna Sheen, Professional Responsibilities Toward Children in Trouble with the Law, 
5 WYO. L. REV. 483, 513–15 (2005). 
 218.  John M. Burman, Juvenile Injustice in Wyoming, 4 WYO. L. REV. 669, 677 (2004); 
see also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-237 (2014). 
 219. Burman, supra note 218, at 689 (“[A] juvenile is potentially subject to the 
jurisdiction of three different courts: the juvenile court[,] . . . circuit court, . . . or 
municipal court.”). 
 220.  See id. 
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processed in juvenile courts.221 Rather, kids of all ages have found 
themselves tangled up with Wyoming’s adult courts, resulting in 
stories like this one offered by a local attorney: “I’ve seen an eight-
year-old in municipal court counting out quarters from her change 
purse to pay a fine imposed on her for using chalk on the outside of 
a barn.”222 
Like municipal court judges in Missouri, those in Wyoming are 
tasked with assessing fines for the benefit of the locality, which are 
then deposited with the town’s treasurer.223 The salary of local judges 
is also set by local officials.224 As in the days of common law justices 
of the peace, the bench has incentive to collect as many fines and 
court costs as possible. Unlike Missouri, Wyoming municipal court 
judges have special statutory powers to allow youth to complete 
community service through youth-focused programs.225 But most 
communities do not fund such projects.226 Wyoming’s shadow 
juvenile justice system, unlike Missouri’s system, has previously been 
the subject of scrutiny and criticism, as well as attempted reform.227 
Yet, reports of direct prosecution of kids in municipal courts without 
any specialized protections continue.228 
 
 221.  ACLU, INEQUALITY IN THE EQUALITY STATE: THE DAMAGED JUVENILE JUSTICE 
AND DETENTION SYSTEM IN WYOMING v (2010) (finding youth are subject to “vastly different 
treatment based on where they live”). 
 222.  Star Tribune Editorial Bd., Editorial, Wyo Legislators Can Learn from Juvenile 
Justice Study, CASPER STAR TRIB., July 18, 2010, http://trib.com/news/opinion/editorial/ 
wyo-legislators-can-learn-from-juvenile-justice-study/article_72b028ea-70df-5913-acd4-
e2f3d48cc8ec.html. 
 223.  Burman, supra note 218, at 691–92. 
 224.  Id. at 691. 
 225.  Id. at 692. 
 226.  Id. 
 227.  See, e.g., Burman, supra note 21818; see also Maggie Lee, Wyoming Inches Towards 
Reform, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE (Oct. 31, 2012), http://jjie.org/wyoming-inches-
toward-reform/. 
 228.  Kelsey Bray, Wyoming’s Juvenile Justice System Sees Progress, WYO. TRIB. EAGLE 
(Dec. 23, 2013), http://www.wyomingnews.com/articles/2013/12/23/news/20local_12-
23-13.txt#.VgV7kMtViko (reporting minor offenses—like youthful alcohol consumption—are 
still being directly prosecuted in adult courts); see also Brice Hamack, Go Directly to Jail, Do 
Not Pass Juvenile Court, Do Not Collect Due Process: Why Waiving Juveniles into Adult Court 
Without a Fitness Hearing is a Denial of their Basic Due Process Rights, 14 WYO. L. REV. 
775 (2014). 
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2. Texas 
Texas also runs a secondary juvenile justice system. Like minors 
in Missouri, minors in Texas are excluded from juvenile courts once 
they turn seventeen, and are directly prosecuted in municipal courts 
for any local ordinance violations.229 But youth under seventeen years 
of age have also faced municipal court prosecution for various Class 
C misdemeanors, including truancy, which carry a fine of up to $500 
and a possible jail sentence.230 The problem of aggressive truancy and 
school-based prosecutions in Texas has received attention over the 
last few years.231 One municipal court judge in particular became 
well-known for imposing criminal convictions on children under 
seventeen, fining them $500, suspending their driving privileges, and 
imposing community service—all just for missing school.232 Beyond 
publically shaming them in the courtroom, the judges might hold 
students who continue to skip class in contempt as well as impose 
jail time. 233  
In 2013, three advocacy groups filed a complaint with the 
United States Department of Justice about such practices.234 The 
Justice Department subsequently opened an investigation in March 
 
 229.  Angelone, supra note 193, at 458; see also Michele Deitch et al., Seventeen, Going 
on Eighteen: An Operational and Fiscal Analysis of a Proposal to Raise the Age of Juvenile 
Jurisdiction in Texas, 40 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (2012). 
 230.  Angelone, supra note 193, at 452; see also, e.g., Court Procedures, CITY OF SAN 
MARCOS TEX. (2015), http://www.ci.san-marcos.tx.us/index.aspx?page=80 (“The municipal 
court has jurisdiction over juveniles (under age 17) charged with most Class C 
misdemeanor offenses.”). 
 231.  See, e.g., Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, For More Teens, Arrests by Police Replace 
School Discipline, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2014, 10:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/for-
more-teens-arrests-by-police-replace-school-discipline-1413858602 (describing misdemeanor 
“tickets” given in Texas schools that send kids to local adult courts); Michael Mulvey, Dallas 
School District Parents with Truant Kids Taught a Lesson, ABC-DALL. (Oct. 16, 2009, 9:50 
AM), http://www.wfaa.com/story/news/local/2014/08/06/13424782/. 
 232.  Mulvey, supra note 231. 
 233.  Id.; see also Christina Sterbenz, Texas is Treating Kids Who Skip Class Like Grown-
Up Criminals, BUS. INSIDER (June 18, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/complaint-
filed-over-texas-truancy-court-2013-6. 
 234.  See Letter from Civil Rights Groups to Civil Rights Division accusing Dallas 
Schools and Truancy Courts of Civil Rights Violations, TEX. APPLESEED (July 1, 2013), 
https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/148-STPP-DOJletterAdding3 
Complainants.pdf. 
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2015.235 Since that time, Texas Governor Greg Abbott signed into 
law a provision that decriminalizes child truancy.236 But the law 
apparently does not impact the government’s ability to directly 
charge children under age seventeen with other Class C 
misdemeanors in adult courts.237 
3. Colorado 
Colorado prosecutes children in local municipal courts rather 
than juvenile courts for matters where jail sentences of less than ten 
days may be imposed.238 Such charges might include anything from 
littering239 to shoplifting.240 The penalties provided under some local 
codes make clear that one set of non-financial penalties is available 
for defendants over eighteen years of age, while a different set applies 
to defendants under eighteen. For instance, in the municipality of 
Grand Junction, adults face up to one year of incarceration for 
convictions241 while youth receive community service sentences.242 
But both adults and children are subject to fines of up to $1000.243 
 
 235.  Press Release, U. S. Dep’t of Just., Department of Justice Announces Investigation 
of the Dallas County Truancy Court and Juvenile District Courts (Mar. 31, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announces-investigation-dallas-county-
truancy-court-and-juvenile-district. 
 236.  Texas Turns Away from Criminal Truancy Courts for Students, AL-JAZEERA AM. 
(June 20, 2015, 4:00 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/6/20/texas-turns-
away-from-criminal-truancy-courts-for-students.html. 
 237.  Id. 
 238.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-104(1)(a)(II) (2014). 
 239.  See, e.g., GRAND JUNCTION, COLO. MUN. CODE, ch. 8.12 (2015). 
 240.  For an example of a shoplifting case, see R.E.N. v. City of Colorado Springs, 823 
P.2d 1359 (Colo. 1992). 
 241.  THE CHARTER OF THE CITY OF GRAND JUNCTION COLORADO, art. XVII, § 148, 
http://www.codepublishing.com/co/grandjunction/html/GrandJunctionCH.html#17.148 
(“Any person 18 years of age or older who shall violate any of the provisions of this Charter for 
the violation of which no punishment has been provided herein, shall be deemed guilty of a 
misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one 
thousand ($1,000.00) dollars, or by imprisonment in jail not exceeding one year, or by both 
such fine and imprisonment.”). 
 242.  Id. (“Any person under 18 years of age who violates any of the provisions of this 
Charter for the violation of which no punishment has been provided herein, shall be punished 
by a fine not exceeding one thousand ($1,000.00) dollars, and/or be required to perform 
useful public service not to exceed 48 hours or any combination thereof.”). 
 243.  Id. 
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In 1992, in one of the only reported legal challenges to such 
practices, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld direct-file municipal 
court prosecutions against children in R.E.N. v. City of Colorado 
Springs.244 The court decided that the existence of a state juvenile 
court system did not preclude non-protective municipal court 
processing of youth.245 
Beyond this, relying on Colorado Home Rule standards, the 
court also upheld the local municipal court’s decision to deny 
accused youth the same protections and procedures provided in the 
juvenile court system246—including the right to counsel, social study, 
and records expungement.247 It found that “neither political entity is 
encroaching on the regulatory sphere of the other” and both “can 
establish the types of proceedings they deem appropriate, within 
constitutional bounds, to prosecute juveniles in their jurisdiction.”248 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER CONCERNS—CASE AGAINST 
MINORS IN MUNIS 
The problem with R.E.N. is that it treated children the same as 
any other local legal issue—like zoning, littering, or speeding. But as 
noted, in the nearly twenty-five years since R.E.N., the United States 
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that kids are constitutionally 
different from adults, and present a sui generis category for legal 
analysis. Beyond this, state laws covering a variety of fields—not just 
juvenile crime control—demonstrate special concern for the legal 
treatment of youth. 
Therefore, while adults surely have reason to protest municipal 
court practices that provide assembly-line justice, deprive them of 
court-appointed counsel, and imprison them for poverty,249 children 
 
 244.  R.E.N., 823 P.2d at 1361. 
 245.  Id. at 1362. 
 246.  Id. at 1363 (“Municipalities are not required to follow the Procedures in the 
Children’s Code simply because the Children’s Code contains detailed and comprehensive 
procedures for juvenile delinquency proceedings brought in state juvenile courts.”). 
 247.  Id. at 1360–61 n.1.  
 248.  Id. at 1363–64. 
 249.  See supra Section II.B; see also ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S 
NEW DEBTORS’ PRISONS 10 (2010) [hereinafter IN FOR A PENNY] (describing a “two-tiered 
system of justice” where “the poorest defendants are punished more harshly than those with 
means” in many local courts). 
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have these and additional compelling grounds to challenge their 
treatment in such systems. Unfortunately, children—especially while 
unrepresented—neither know the basic legal protections to which 
they are entitled, nor have the wherewithal to litigate complex state 
law, federal law, and constitutional issues.250 The next Section seeks 
to shed light on the manifold constitutional, legal, and policy 
concerns presented by the prosecution of minors in municipal courts 
that to date have gone largely unnoticed and unchecked. 
A. Stigmatizing and Traumatizing Vulnerable Youth 
As noted, the growing practice in this country of prosecuting 
and penalizing poverty has drawn sharp criticism from all corners.251 
Countless adult defendants have come forward in recent years to 
share how such practices have not only wreaked havoc on their lives, 
but also served to degrade and demoralize them in the courtroom 
and the larger community.252 And, of course, the United States 
Department of Justice’s Ferguson Police Department investigation 
confirms many such accounts.253 
The working poor recount enduring extraordinary hardship—in 
addition to stress and shame—as a result of financial sanctions for 
 
 250.  I further explore this dilemma in my article in progress, (Im)mobilizing Youth 
(forthcoming). See also Annette Ruth Appell, Accommodating Childhood, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & 
GENDER 715, 750 (2013) (acknowledging inherent vulnerabilities and disabilities of 
childhood justifying special protections, while also calling for greater participatory rights 
for youth). 
 251.  See, e.g., Michael Pinard, Poor, Black and “Wanted”: Criminal Justice in Ferguson 
and Baltimore, 58 HOW. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015); Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Local Courts 
Reviving ‘Debtors’ Prison’ for Overdue Fines, Fees, FOX NEWS (Dec. 28, 2013), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/12/28/local-courts-reviving-debtors-prison-for-
overdue-fines-fees/; Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Debtors’ Prisons: Thrive or Serve Jail Time?, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/Latest-
News-Wires/2013/0404/Debtors-prisons-Thrive-or-serve-jail-time. 
 252.  Even late-night talk show comedians have highlighted the plight of such 
individuals, including John Oliver with his coverage of Harriett Cleveland of Montgomery, 
Alabama. See SPLC Client Featured on “Last Week Tonight” Segment on Debtors’ Prisons, S. 
POVERTY L. CTR. (Mar. 22, 2015), http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/news/splc-
client-featured-on-last-week-tonight-segment-on-debtors-prisons; see also KAREN DOLAN & 
JODI L. CARR, THE POOR GET PRISON: THE ALARMING SPREAD OF THE CRIMINALIZATION 
OF POVERTY (2015), http://www.ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/IPS-The-Poor-
Get-Prison-Final.pdf. 
 253.  INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 7. 
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low-level local ordinance violations.254 For instance, a local judge 
dressed down one Ohio mother by laughing at her as she cried in the 
courtroom.255 Across California, countless individuals live in fear of 
public arrest because of their poverty.256 And in St. Louis, on any 
given evening, lines of black citizens waiting to see judges about 
their cases have been seen streaming out of the municipal court 
doors and down the street, often while seats remain empty in the 
courtroom.257 In the end, sometimes giving up hope of getting out 
from under these pressures, many go underground hoping police 
and warrants will not find them.258 
As horrifying as these stories are when told by grown adults, they 
are far worse when shared by children.259 But in some parts of the 
country, youth, who are not old enough to hold a job, sign a lease, 
or even vote, endure the same dehumanizing processes, indignities, 
and pressures. 
Without lawyers at their side or even a trusted adult to explain 
the process to them, many young people attempt to make sense of 
confusing legal documents, complicated agreement terms, and 
ongoing requirements delivered from the bench.260 But in the 
jargon-filled, fast-moving world that is local municipal court practice, 
it is hard to imagine how even the most mature child can knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily enter a guilty plea, forgo rights, and 
 
 254.  See generally ACLU OF OHIO, THE OUTSKIRTS OF HOPE: HOW OHIO’S DEBTORS’ 
PRISONS ARE RUINING LIVES AND COSTING COMMUNITIES (Apr. 2013). 
 255.  Id. 
 256.  ALEX BENDER ET AL., NOT JUST A FERGUSON PROBLEM: HOW TRAFFIC COURTS 
DRIVE INEQUALITY IN CALIFORNIA (2015), http://www.lccr.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
Not-Just-a-Ferguson-Problem-How-Traffic-Courts-Drive-Inequality-in-California-4.8.15.pdf. 
 257.  Quinn, supra note 37, at 2204–05. 
 258.  See Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, The Poor Are Paying the Price, NPR (May 
23, 2014, 10:02 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-
fees-punish-the-poor (“The result is that people face arrest and go underground to avoid 
police. But this means they cut themselves off from job opportunities, welfare benefits or other 
programs that could get them on their feet.”). 
 259.  IN FOR A PENNY, supra note 249, at 46–47. 
 260.  But even with an adult present, many such children make decisions without 
understanding the gravity of the situation or reliable advice. For instance, one Texas mother, 
“a hair stylist, didn’t have an attorney and Googled advice on how her daughter should plead” 
at court. See Texas Turns Away from Criminal Truancy Courts for Students, supra note 236. 
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accept the terms presented. Yet, in some jurisdictions, kids age 
seventeen and younger are expected to do just that.261 
Advocates, teachers, and other youth allies see the unfortunate 
results of these rushed courtroom arrangements.262 Already at-risk 
kids report they did not understand what was happening in court 
and were too scared to speak up.263 The practical effect—unpaid 
fines, court fees, and then arrest warrants—is that such kids are 
passed over for jobs, turned away from housing, and civilly disabled 
in other ways as they try to become young adults.264 And for many 
youth, hopelessness and desperation may set in while operating 
under the weight of these adult responsibilities.265 
More fundamentally, many of these municipal cases stem from 
behaviors that are absolutely normal for teenagers. They do not 
reflect deviance, violence, or propensity for harming others.266 
Instead, ordinary adolescent actions such as making noise, 
congregating in groups, or mouthing back to adults are frequently 
deemed unlawful by expansive local ordinance code provisions.267 
 
 261.  See supra Section III.A.  And here, again, it is clear that as a matter of law 
seventeen-year-old children facing charges in municipal courts receive no specialized 
consideration as a matter of law. Given the morass that is Missouri law, idiosyncrasies in local 
practices, and a lack of publicly available data about youth processing in municipal courts, it is 
not entirely clear what has been happening to fifteen- and sixteen-year-old defendants who face 
charges, fail to appear, fall behind on fines, and the like. See supra Section III.A. 
 262.  This author’s clinic has been repeatedly contacted by school teachers, social services 
providers, counselors and others seeking assistance for youth dealing with municipal court 
charges, fines, and warrants stemming from incidents when they were just seventeen years old. 
Colleagues at the Colorado Juvenile Defender Center (CJDC) have similarly encountered 
young people who have pleaded guilty in such courts without having a lawyer to assist them. 
Zoe Schein, The Dangers of Municipal Courts for Youth, NAT’L JUV. JUST. NETWORK NEWS 
CTR. (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.njjn.org/article/dangers-of-municipal-courts-for-youth. 
 263.  See Wessler & Seville, supra note 216; see also BENDER ET AL., supra note 256, at 15 
(recounting the story of “Joshua,” a homeless youth, who lives in fear of arrest for a warrant 
relating to “lodging” on a public street overnight). 
 264.  Wessler & Seville, supra note 216. 
 265.  Id; see also Balko, supra note 8 (describing how youth in St. Louis are impacted by 
municipal court practices). 
 266.  Gerstein & Prescott, supra note 161 at 278–79 (noting that those convicted of 
low-level quality of life charges usually are no danger to society—but have “merely offended 
other people’s sensibilities”). 
 267.  See, e.g., FLORISSANT, MO., MUN. CODE § 210.376 (providing that “[n]o person 
shall loiter . . . at a time or manner not usual for a law abiding citizen” or “take[] flight” from 
police); JENNINGS, MO., CITY CODE § 24.29 (defining disorderly conduct as, among other 
things, using “insulting language” where a “breach of the peace may be occasioned”); 
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Many of these provisions are fatally overbroad or improperly chill 
First Amendment rights.268 And even if constitutional, if presented in 
a properly functioning juvenile court, such matters should be 
handled informally or with warnings and dismissals.269 Both 
substantive law and court procedures in many municipalities fail to 
account for adolescent development, brain science teachings, and 
what most any mother or father will tell you—that kids will, and 
should, be kids. 
Therefore, as a matter of common sense, charging and 
prosecuting juveniles under the age of eighteen with low-level 
ordinance violations in this way is antithetical to the government’s 
role in supporting youth.270 They also run contrary to the most 
recent holdings of the Supreme Court, acknowledging youth under 
the age of eighteen as a vulnerable group in need of special 
treatment by our courts.271 Rather than protecting young people, 
such localized practices—which might be seen as a form of in loco 
juvenile justice—traumatize and reduce the life chances of some of 
the country’s most vulnerable and already traumatized 
young people.272 
 
UNIVERSITY CITY, MO., CODE § 215.385 (“It is unlawful for any person to fail or refuse to 
obey a reasonable order or direction of a police officer.”); see also Kristin Henning, 
Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communities of Color: The Role of Prosecutors in 
Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 383, 395–97 (2013). 
 268.  See, e.g., Peter W. Poulos, Chicago’s Ban on Gang Loitering: Making Sense of 
Vagueness and Overbreadth in Loitering Laws, 83 CAL. L. REV. 379, 382 (1995); see also 
INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 7, at 24–28. 
 269.  See MODELS FOR CHANGE, supra note 34, at 104. 
 270.  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (noting that its decisions rested 
not only on common sense—on what “any parent knows”—but on science and social science 
as well). 
 271.  See supra Sections I.C. & I.D. 
 272.  See ERICA J. ADAMS, HEALING INVISIBLE WOUNDS: WHY INVESTING IN TRAUMA-
INFORMED CARE FOR CHILDREN MAKES SENSE 3 (Just. Pol’y Inst. ed., 2010), 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/10-07_REP_HealingInvisibleWounds_JJ-
PS.pdf (reporting that many economically challenged urban youth of color suffer trauma 
through exposure to violence and other destabilizing factors in their communities); Trauma 
Informed Systems of Care, NAT’L CTR. JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, http://www.ncjfcj.org/our-
work/trauma-informed-system-care (last visited Sept. 18, 2015) (“The juvenile justice system 
needs to be trauma informed at all levels.”). 
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B. Side-Stepping Federal Mandates 
In many municipal courts around the country, prosecution 
practices not only harm young people, but also conflict with federal 
laws specifically intended to protect against harsh treatment of 
juveniles. On the books for over forty years, the federal Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency and Prevention Act (JJDPA) was enacted to 
help states improve their youth justice systems.273 Known as one of 
most important pieces of juvenile legislation in this country’s history, 
its provisions seek to reduce harm to court involved kids.274 
Today, the JJDPA has several core components or goals that 
states must satisfy to receive federal juvenile justice funding. The first 
is deinstitutionalization of youthful “status offenders.”275 The second 
involves protective measures for youth in custody, including 
separating them both physically and by “sight and sound” from adult 
prisoners.276 A third goal is reduction of juvenile “disproportionate 
minority contact (DMC) with the justice system.”277 
Status offenses are defined as behaviors that are unlawful because 
they are committed by youth.278 Activities like underage drinking, 
underage smoking, curfew violations, and truancy are common 
examples of such charges where the child’s minor status is essential 
to the charge.279 Under the JJDPA, states should not respond to such 
youthful indiscretions with arrest and placement in secure facilities—
juvenile detention centers or otherwise.280 Instead, federal funding is 
provided to support deinstitutionalization in such cases to avoid 
 
 273.  42 U.S.C. § 5601 (2012). 
 274.  Gary Gately, Will This Be the Year JJDPA is Reauthorized?, JUV. JUST. INFO. 
EXCHANGE, (Sept. 4, 2014), http://jjie.org/will-this-be-the-year-jjdpa-is-reauthorized/ 
(noting that states that fail to comply with the components of the JJDPA are “really doing 
harm to [juveniles] in the system”). 
 275.  Compliance with the Core Requirements of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention Act, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, http://www.ojjdp.gov/ 
compliance/index.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2015). 
 276.  Id. 
 277.  Id. 
 278.  See 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(11) (2012) (referring to “juveniles who are charged with 
or who have committed an offense that would not be criminal if committed by an adult”). 
 279.  Patricia J. Arthur & Regina Waugh, Status Offenses and the Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention Act: The Exception that Swallowed the Rule, 7 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 
555, 555 (2009). 
 280.  Id. 
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unnecessary incarceration and harm to kids based on minor 
adolescent misbehaviors.281 
Unfortunately, the practices in many jurisdictions appear to 
frustrate the intention of these provisions.  For instance, in Wyoming 
the municipal ordinance violation of minor in possession of alcohol is 
excluded from the state’s definition of status offenses.282 In 
Wyoming, not only are youth subject to secure detention for such 
offenses—but may be prosecuted as adults in municipal courts and 
sentenced to adult jail time.283 
In Missouri, the current morass of state Juvenile Code and local 
Municipal Code provisions also appear to frustrate JJDPA’s goal of 
deinstitutionalization of status offenders. For instance, the Juvenile 
Code provides that juvenile courts have concurrent jurisdiction with 
municipal courts for youthful curfew cases.284 But it does not further 
direct which entity has primary responsibility for these matters or 
how they should be processed, prosecuted, or punished. 
Some Missouri municipal codes expressly state that curfew cases 
can be referred to juvenile court for processing.285 Yet, interestingly, 
some local curfew provisions apply to youth up to age eighteen.286 
Related ambiguities and interpretation problems exist for underage 
smoking, which is handled differently across different municipalities 
in Missouri. On the face of their Ordinance Codes, places like 
Ferguson appear to permit fines of up to $1000 and three months in 
jail for any violator under the age of eighteen without any reference 
to juveniles or juvenile court.287 
In fact, the very definition of “status offense” and to whom it 
applies in Missouri is far from clear. In 2008, the Missouri legislature 
sought to extend the coverage of juvenile court status offense 
prosecutions to cover youth up to age eighteen, rather than just 
 
 281.  Id. at 558. 
 282.  John M. Burman, Juvenile Injustice in Wyoming, 4 WYO. L. REV. 669, 686–
87 (2004). 
 283.  Id. 
  284.  MO. REV. STAT. § 211.031.1(2)–(3). 
 285.  See, e.g., JENNINGS, MO., MUN. ORDINANCE § 24-17. 
 286.  See, e.g., id.; FERGUSON, MO., MUN. ORDINANCE § 29-91. 
 287.  See FERGUSON, MO., MUN. ORDINANCE §§ 29-153(b), 29-155, 1-15. But see 
FLORRISANT, MO., MUN. ORDINANCE § 210.500 (allowing for fines only, ranging from $50 
for first offenses and up to $750 for subsequent incidents of underage smoking). 
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seventeen.288 However, the enabling legislation indicated such a 
change would not occur until the legislature also provided funding 
to support extending juvenile court jurisdiction.289 To date, despite 
repeated requests by our court system for funding, this has not 
occurred.290 Seventeen-year-olds remain in a kind of legislative limbo 
in the Show Me State when it comes to status allegations. 
Finally, while Missouri’s Juvenile Code expressly defines certain 
acts as status offenses—like failing to attend school and running 
away from home—any offense “not classified as criminal” is also 
considered a status offense if committed by a child under the age of 
eighteen.291 As municipal proceedings are merely civil in nature, it 
would seem that every municipal ordinance charge involving a minor 
should be interpreted as a status offense, thereby precluding arrest 
and secure detention in a jail or juvenile detention center under the 
JJDPA. But this does not appear to be the case. 
Jurisdictions may not be reporting such issues as violations of 
JJDPA. They may claim that once state law provides exclusive or 
concurrent jurisdiction to adult venues—like municipal courts—such 
matters are no longer considered “juvenile” cases under the Act.292 
But such claims seem to place form over substance and thwart the 
 
 288.  See MO. JUV. CODE § 211.021(2) (expanding definition of “child” to cover “any 
person over seventeen but not yet eighteen years of age alleged to have committed a 
status offense”). 
 289.  See MO. JUV. CODE § 211.021(2) (Revisor’s note clarifies withholding effective 
date of expanded definition of status offense until sufficient appropriations are made to 
support the expansion); see also Mo. H.B. 1550 (2008). 
 290.  MO. OFFICE OF ADMIN., 2015 MISSOURI JUDICIARY BUDGET REQUEST 5 (Sept. 
20, 2013), https://oa.mo.gov/sites/default/files/Judiciary%20FY%202015%20Budget.pdf 
(seeking over four-million dollars to implement HB 1550, which was signed into law seven 
years earlier in 2008). 
 291.  See Mo. Stat. Ann. §§ 211.021(2), (7), 211.031.1(2)(e). As noted earlier, the 
legislature has specially carved out non-felony traffic offenses for those age fifteen to eighteen 
as exclusively municipal matters, and provided concurrent jurisdiction between juvenile and 
municipal court for certain curfew and tobacco violations.  Mo. Stat. Ann. § 211.031.1(3).  
But the Juvenile Code also suggests Juvenile Courts do not have jurisdiction over tobacco 
cases.  See Mo. Stat. Ann. § 211.031.1(2). 
 292.  CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, JUVENILES IN JAILS: THE DANGERS OF 
INCARCERATING YOUTH IN ADULT JAILS IN AMERICA 5 (2007), 
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/CFYJNR_JailingJuveniles.pdf 
(describing the use in many states of a “loophole” in the JJDPA and its enabling regulations 
that allows states to treat as adults any youth certified to criminal court or direct filed into 
such institutions). 
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spirit and intention of JJDPA’s deinstitutionalization mandate. It is 
also notable that federal regulatory exclusions focus on the 
distinction between juvenile and criminal court proceedings—
without offering much insight about municipal courts that might 
hold themselves out as civil venues.293 
Similar issues can be seen in municipal management of arrested 
youth—both in terms of separation requirements and DMC 
reporting. The general rule is that juveniles may not be housed with 
adults in jails and detention centers, even during temporary stays. 
Instead, they must be protected by what has become known as 
“sight and sound” separation.  294 But as described above, across the 
country youth under eighteen may pass through local holding cells 
and jails each year. And, particularly in smaller municipal police 
departments and courthouses, physical facilities may not ensure 
complete separation—and protection—of youth from adults.295 
More than this, some jurisdictions may be excluding traffic 
arrests and other ordinance violation arrests from their JJDPA count 
numbers. Here, too, they may claim that because municipal courts, 
rather than juvenile courts, have original jurisdiction in such cases, 
they are not “juvenile” matters for purposes of reporting 
requirements. These same jurisdictions may be undercounting 
youthful minority contact with the justice system, by excluding 
traffic, and other municipal ordinance cases from annual reports 
seeking to discern racial disparities in juvenile policing 
and prosecution.296 
 
 293.  See Substantive Requirements, 28 CFR § 31.303 (2015). What is more, new 
regulations providing greater clarity consistent with the original goals of the JJDPA appear to 
be in progress. See Liz Ryan, Federal Juvenile Justice Regs: What’s the Hold Up?, CHRON. SOC. 
CHANGE (Apr. 29, 2014), https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/opinion/federal-juvenile-
justice-regs-whats-the-holdup/6422. 
 294.  42 U.S.C. §§ 5633(a)(12)–(13) (2012); see also 28 CFR § 31.303. 
   295.  See, e.g., Gary Gately, Grassley OJJDP Probe Widens, Implicating 6 States, 2 
Territories, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE (Mar. 4, 2015), http://jjie.org/grassley-ojjdp-probe-
widens-implicating-6-states-2-territories/ (raising questions about sight and sound compliance 
in states like Idaho and Tennessee). 
   296.  In fact, as this article goes to press, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention is revisiting its guidelines for statutory interpretation and compliance under the 
JJDPA.  For instance its facilities monitoring manual is currently being updated see, e.g., 
OJJDP GUIDANCE MANUAL (2010), http://www.ojjdp.gov/compliance/ 
guidancemanual2010.pdf/.  In addition OJJDP Administrator Robert L. Listenbee issued a 
policy statement reminding states that if requirements are not satisfied they may lose federal 
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C. Displacing State Law through Local Adultification of Kids 
Minors in municipal courts raise other significant legal concerns. 
States may provide local municipal courts with jurisdiction in the 
cases of some children in conflict with the law. But that does not 
mean local governments can ignore the much-occupied fields of state 
juvenile law and child welfare. Although some scholars have recently 
proposed greater local influence over family affairs297 and contested 
the extent to which federal interests impact family law principles,298 
the state has long stood as a central government agent in protecting 
the rights and needs of children in this country.299 Under this 
traditional allocation of power, state norms and goals around child 
treatment and welfare should trump in loco juvenile justice practices 
that directly conflict with them or undermine their achievement. 
1. Lack of power in special fields of child law and regulation 
States differ in their approaches to delegation of “home rule” 
authority.300 In some jurisdictions, municipalities have “no inherent 
powers” and may legislate locally only to the extent expressly 
permitted by state law.301 Thus, although a municipal court system 
may have jurisdictional powers in some youthful offender matters, it 
 
juvenile justice funds.  See U.S. DEP’T JUST., OJJDP POLICY: MONITORING OF STATE 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ACT (2015), 
http://www.ojjdp.gov/compliance/monitoring-state-compliance-JJDPA-policy.pdf 
 297.  See, e.g., Sean H. Williams, Sex (and Money) in the City, 21 (U. of Tex. L., Pub. L. 
Res., Paper No. 625, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2532589. 
 298.  Laura A. Rosenbury, Federal Visions of Private Family Support, 67 VAND. L. REV. 
1835, 1836 (2014); Courtney G. Joslin, Federalism and Family Status, 90 IND. L.J. 
787 (2015). 
 299.  See Joanna L. Grossman, Family Law’s Loose Canon, 93 TEX. L. REV. 681, 690 
(2015) (book review) (“[I]t is still by and large true that family law and family status are 
controlled by the states.”); see also Meredith Johnson Harbach, Is the Family a Federal 
Question?, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 131, 134 (2009) (noting that historically family law has 
been seen as a “quintessentially state issue”); Rosenbury, supra note 298, at 1836  (“The 
individual states have long played a primary role in defining the legal family in the United 
States, with states often determining who does and does not enjoy the legal status of spouse, 
parent, and child.”). 
 300.  See Williams, supra note 297, at 2 (discussing the distinction between generally less 
empowered “legislative” and more empowered “imperio” home rule states). 
 301.  See, e.g., Damon v. City of Kansas City, 419 S.W.3d 162, 183 (Mo. App. W.D. 
2013) (“A city has no inherent powers, but is confined to those expressly delegated by the 
state and those necessarily implied in the authority to carry out the delegated powers.”). 
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does not necessarily follow that they have the authority to create 
penalty or enforcement schemes in such cases.302 And, even where 
such authority may be implied from local jurisdictional powers, 
municipal courts do not have carte blanche to prosecute and punish 
as they wish.303 
Municipal court defendants are generally entitled to due process 
and constitutional protections.304 But municipalities must take 
particular care when dealing with child defendants as a class of 
litigants. Not only have children been deemed categorically less 
culpable as a matter of Supreme Court constitutional law,305 they 
have long held a special place in state law and policy.306 
For instance, across the country state laws affirmatively require 
parents to provide for their children,307 schools to educate them,308 
and police to protect them.309 Entire administrative structures have 
been constructed by most states to ensure maintenance of these 
supportive features, as well as to intervene when they are not 
 
 302.  See, e.g., Village of Depue Illinois v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 537 F.3d 775, 787 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (holding that although municipality had the right to adopt certain provisions, it 
could not apply or enforce them in a way that exceeded its authority). 
 303.  See, e.g., Zilba v. City of Port Clinton, Ohio, 924 F. Supp. 2d 867, 885 (N.D. Ohio 
2013) (stating that the power to regulate parking did not allow for creation of penalty scheme 
inconsistent with state penalties for parking offenses); see also Ryals v. City of Englewood, 962 
F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1251 (D. Colo. 2013). 
 304.  See, e.g., Damon, 419 S.W.3d at 191 (holding that municipal court must provide 
due process and other constitutional and statutory procedural protections to defendants). 
 305.  See supra Sections I.C,  I.D. 
 306.  See generally State Child Welfare Policy Database, About Us, CASEY FAM. PROGRAMS 
(2010), http://www.childwelfarepolicy.org/about_us (making “publicly available an array of 
state child welfare policies so that policy makers, practitioners, and other stakeholders can stay 
abreast of the policies that protect our nation’s most vulnerable children”). 
 307.  See State Child Welfare Policy Database, Data by Topic, CASEY FAM. PROGRAMS 
(2010), http://www.childwelfarepolicy.org/maps/single?id=137 (showing state by state 
provisions on parental responsibilities). 
 308.  See Paul L. Tractenberg, Education Provisions in State Constitutions (forthcoming 
in STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY), http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecon/ 
subpapers/tractenberg.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2015). 
 309.  See Theodore P. Cross et al., Police Involvement in Child Protection Services 
Investigations, 10 CHILD MALTREATMENT 1, 2 (2005), http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/ 
CV83.pdf (“The nature of their mutual involvement in the same cases follows from CPS’s 
mission to ensure children’s safety and well-being in caretaking relationships and law 
enforcement’s mission to investigate crimes and protect the public safety.”). 
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functioning as they should.310 Further, broad swaths of protective 
legislation—from anti-child labor regulations,311 to mandatory 
reporting provisions,312 to laws prohibiting contract enforcement 
against minors313—affirmatively set the stage for adult engagement 
with young people in every state. 
While state legislators may have allowed for municipalities to take 
jurisdiction over some ordinance cases involving children—that is, 
sharing the field with regard to who might accept such matters—
none appears to have expressly offered to share the fields of child 
treatment and family protection. Nor did they likely intend to do so, 
particularly in the manner we see happening in many of 
today’s localities. 
Yet municipal policing and prosecution practices that engage 
children without consent of their guardians, take them out of their 
family homes, disrupt their educational services, or seek to enforce 
financial and contractual obligations surely encroach upon zones 
intended to be maintained exclusively by the state to ensure the well-
being of its children. In fact, despite its holding in R.E.N. over two 
decades ago, the Colorado Supreme Court has recently struck down 
municipal actions on state field preemption grounds based on these 
very concerns. 
In 2000, Juliana Ibarra was a Colorado foster mother for three 
children, each of whom had been both the victims and perpetrators 
of sexual abuse.314 Despite their status as child victims, the youth 
were adjudicated delinquent for their actions and required to register 
under Colorado state law as sex offenders.315 However, that same 
 
 310.  See, e.g., Child Protective Services, N.Y. ST. OFF. CHILD. & FAM. SERV., 
http://www.ocfs.state.ny.us/main/cps/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2015); Child Protection Services, 
CAL. DEP’T OF SOC. SERV. (2007), http://www.dss.cahwnet.gov/cdssweb/pg93.htm. 
 311.  See Wage Hour Division (WHD): State Child Labor Laws Applicable to Agricultural 
Employment, U.S. DEP’T LAB. (Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/ 
agriemp2.htm. 
 312.  See State Child Welfare Policy Database, Persons Required to Report, CASEY FAM. 
PROGRAMS (Apr. 2010), http://www.childwelfarepolicy.org/maps/single?id=160. 
 313.  See, e.g., ILL. ST. B. ASS’N, KIDS AND THE LAW: AN A TO Z GUIDE FOR PARENTS 3 
(2008), http://www.isba.org/sites/default/files/teachers/publications/Kids%20and%20the 
%20Law.pdf (noting that children in Illinois do not have the ability to contract until they reach 
age 18—or the age of majority). 
 314.  City of Northglenn v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d 151, 153–54 (Colo. 2003). 
 315.  Id. As explained by Ms. Ibarra, “These kids need protecting. They are not like 
pedophiles. They were [sexually] violated before and they responded [by violating their 
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year the city of Northglenn, where Juliana and her children lived, 
passed Ordinance 1248.316 According to youth advocates, the law 
was an attempt to redefine “the term ‘family’ so as to exclude any 
household that contains more than one individual who must register 
as a sex offender.”317 Thus, by allowing unrelated sex offenders to 
live in her home, Ms. Ibarra allegedly violated local law.318 She was 
ultimately charged, prosecuted, and fined.319 
Ms. Ibarra appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court alleging, 
among other things, that punishment under Ordinance 1248 
amounted to an unfair infringement on “the right to personal choice 
in matters of family life.”320 That is, her foster family was “torn 
apart” by the local law’s enforcement.321 In holding that enforcement 
of the Ordinance was implicitly preempted by the state’s 
preeminence in the fields of family law and child welfare, the Court 
noted that “Ordinance 1248 and the Children’s Code superficially 
appear to regulate two different subject matters.”322 However, as 
applied, local law infringed on the state’s ability to meet its 
obligations to youth.323 The Court ultimately held that application of 
Ordinance 1248 was “preempted because it regulate[d] a matter of 
statewide concern: adjudicated delinquent children in state-created 
foster care families.”324 
Although the issue before the Colorado Supreme Court related 
to state-placed foster and delinquent youth, its analysis applies with 
equal force to other matters of child welfare, family integrity, and the 
legal status of juveniles. Indeed, the Court noted that “[t]he parens 
patriae interests in the welfare of children have always been a matter 
of state legislation.”325 Thus, local laws applied in ways that implicate 
 
siblings].” George Lane & Stacie Oulton, Sex Offender Rule Loses in Court, DENVER POST 
(Mar. 20, 2001), http://extras.denverpost.com/news/news0320b.htm. 
 316.  City of Northglenn, 62 P.3d at 153. 
 317.  City of Northglenn v. Ibarra, ACLU OF COLO. (2012), http://aclu-co.org/court-
cases/city-of-northglenn-v-ibarra/. 
 318.  City of Northglenn, 62 P.3d at 154. 
 319.  Id. 
 320.  Id. 
 321.  See Lane & Oulton, supra note 315. 
 322.  City of Northglenn, 62 P.3d at 160. 
 323.  Id. 
 324.  Id. at 163. 
 325.  Id. at 162. 
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child law matters which have been “traditionally and historically 
regulated by the state” should be treated as implicitly preempted.326 
Even if not expressly so denoted, therefore, a state’s historic 
commitment to the regulation of child treatment in the home and 
society may be read as entirely preempting municipal court child 
punishment practices that implicate these areas.327 Any action beyond 
taking jurisdiction may involve entry into fields of law and regulation 
intended to remain under state control.328 
2. Specific conflicts with contract and other doctrines 
Many municipal court practices also directly conflict with, or 
affirmatively frustrate the goals of, state laws relating to children. As 
noted above, under most state statutory and regulatory schemes, 
youth are legally dependent upon their parents or guardians who 
have the power to make a range of decisions about their lives. Even 
the most basic determination of whether a child is permitted to take 
a bus across town to visit a courthouse is one that, under state law, 
begins with an assessment of the need for child autonomy under the 
circumstances, the role of parent, and the significance of the 
familial structure.329 
Therefore, taking children into custody by warrant without 
parental notice or consent, making determinations that might impact 
a child’s education, and even summoning a child before the bench 
necessarily implicates state-constructed legal frameworks.330 What is 
 
 326.  Id. at 162–63. 
 327.  Id. 
 328.  See id. at 162 (“Although the Constitution assigns home-rule powers to 
Northglenn . . . it does not specifically provide that Northglenn may regulate land-use in such 
a manner that also regulates the number of adjudicated delinquent children living in foster 
care homes.”). 
 329.  See Sarah Swan, Home Rules, 64 DUKE L.J. 823, 824 (2015) (“The ability to 
‘establish a home and bring up children’ is a fundamental part of the American dream.”) 
(internal citation omitted); Annette R. Appell, The Child Question, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
1137, 1155 (2013) (“Children are, effectively, under coverture of their parents; this includes 
management of their own spiritual and physical health and their freedom to choose their own 
activities, labor, and education.”). 
 330.  Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 833–34 
(2007) (“[A]bsent abuse or other forms of perceived family default, parents enjoy almost 
complete authority over their children at home.”). One exception to this general concept of 
difference is a child’s independent right to counsel, regardless of the position of the guardian 
or parent. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34–38 (1967); see also Kristin Henning, Juvenile Justice 
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more, these practices simply disregard the legal deference generally 
provided to families as units and legal protections afforded to youth 
as vulnerable individuals.331 Accordingly, they would appear to be 
implicitly preempted by state law. 
Another area of long-standing state-law child regulation relates 
to privacy and confidentiality. Juvenile, family, and education law and 
procedures have generally protected the identity of children from the 
general public, particularly when the information in question may be 
intimate or stigmatizing.332 This is why juvenile courts are generally 
closed to those who do not have a direct interest in the proceedings 
and education records are not available to the general public like 
other government records.333 
But as described above, many municipal courts subject children 
to automatic public presentation and shaming by way of prosecution 
of low-level ordinance violations. Even if not in direct contravention 
of a particular statute, such practices may work to frustrate the spirit 
and purposes of the various privacy-protecting provisions established 
by the state on behalf of children. 
Perhaps the most striking example of direct conflict can be seen 
in municipal court financial sanction practices. As a matter of state 
law, children are considered dependent upon the adults in their 
lives.334 Thus, there are affirmative restrictions on their ability to 
 
after Graham v. Florida: Keeping Due Process, Autonomy, and Paternalism in Balance, 38 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 17, 18 (2012) (noting how modern juvenile law should evaluate 
“protective rights that are necessary to ensure accurate fact-finding and prevent undue 
coercion by the state” differently from “capacity-based rights that are arguably only 
appropriate for youth who have sufficient capacity to exercise them”). 
 331.  Id.; see also Appell, supra note 250 (exploring tension between child’s autonomy 
versus role within family unit). 
 332.  See generally RIYA SAHA SHAH, LAUREN FINE & JAMIE GULLEN, JUVENILE 
RECORDS: A NATIONAL REVIEW OF STATE LAWS ON CONFIDENTIALITY, SEALING AND 
EXPUNGEMENT (2014), http://juvenilerecords.jlc.org/juvenilerecords/documents/ 
publications/national-review.pdf; LISA LARSEN, MINN. H. RES. DEP’T, FEDERAL AND STATE 
LAWS GOVERNING ACCESS TO STUDENT RECORDS (2000), 
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/studrec.pdf. 
 333.  SHAH ET AL., supra note 332; see also NAT’L ASS’N OF COUNS. FOR CHILD., POLICY 
STATEMENT: CONFIDENTIALITY OF JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDINGS AND RECORDS 2 (1998), 
http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.naccchildlaw.org/resource/resmgr/policy/policy_statement
_-_confident.pdf (advocating a case-by-case basis analysis of confidentiality in juvenile courts, 
with the interest of the child serving as paramount consideration). 
 334.  See, e.g., McNamara v. McNamara, 181 N.W.2d 206, 210 (Iowa 1970) (“[B]oth 
parents are under the same legal duty to support their children.”); Morrison v. Richerson, 497 
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enter into financially binding contracts. Youth under the age of 
eighteen generally may not take out car loans or rent apartments.335 
And adults who seek to enter into such an arrangement with a child, 
under most state law schemes, do so at their own peril.336 The 
agreement will not be upheld; it will be voided as a matter of law.337 
Yet, in many places, municipal court judges allow children to 
enter into agreements to pay fines, court fees, and other litigation 
costs and then seek to enforce them through warrants, contempt 
orders, threats of arrest, and even detention or incarceration.338 This 
practice stands in stark contrast to what is generally permitted under 
state law contract frameworks constructed to protect children from 
intimidation, overreaching, and financial liability during their 
formative years.339 It may well be that some features of these state-
constructed frameworks are not sufficiently nuanced and thus worth 
revisiting in the days ahead.340 But these are matters for state 
legislatures and courts—not local municipal actors. In loco juvenile 
justice is thus prohibited. 
D. Denying Youth a Modern Constitutional Right to Juvenile Court 
Finally, as described above, constitutional juvenile law is at an 
important crossroads. Recent United States Supreme Court 
pronouncements establishing the evolving standards of youth 
standard suggest a fundamental shift in thinking about sentencing 
children as adults. More than this, particularly when coupled with 
 
N.W.2d 506, 506 (Mich. App. 1993) (noting that a child has right to financial support from 
parent); In re Adoption of Marlene, 822 N.E.2d 714, 719 (Mass. 2005) (describing the 
history of child dependence and duty of parental support in Massachusetts). 
 335.  See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Reading House. Auth., 8 F.3d 961, 966 (3d Cir. 
1993) (youth unable to enter into lease with housing authority); Halbman v. Lemke, 99 Wis. 
2d 241, 247–50 (1980) (finding a youth’s car contract voided). 
 336.  Victoria Slade, Note, The Infancy Defense in the Modern Contract Age: A Useful 
Vestige, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 613, 617 (2011) (“The [infancy] doctrine exists to protect 
minors from foolishly squandering their wealth through improvident contracts with crafty 
adults who would take advantage of them in the market place.”) (internal quotation and 
citation omitted). 
 337.  5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 9:5 (4th ed.). 
   338.  See supra Part III. 
 339.  See generally Slade, supra note 336. 
 340.  Id. (noting calls by some contemporary commentators for softening of the infancy 
defense in contract cases, particularly in light of youthful online behaviors and sophistication). 
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the Supreme Court’s earlier cases providing basic protections for 
juveniles facing juvenile court prosecution, these developments may 
finally dictate a child’s constitutional right to juvenile court in the 
first instance. 
As noted, numerous challenges to the practice of “automatic” 
criminal court prosecution of children were raised and litigated 
during the 1970s and 1980s. And courts repeatedly held that there 
was no presumption in favor of juvenile court prosecution.341 States 
were not required to establish juvenile court systems at all. 
Therefore, legislatures could do as they pleased to create exclusions 
and exceptions to juvenile court prosecution and treatment.342 But 
much has changed since the 1970s and 1980s.343 
At this point it is hard to imagine any state closing its juvenile 
court system. If any tried to do so, it is difficult to believe such 
action would go without massive resistance—followed by 
maintenance of the system. In fact, standards have evolved over the 
last few decades such that both public sentiment and constitutional 
standards recognize children are inherently different from adults 
and, in most cases, require different treatment.344 While there may 
not be an inherent right to be treated as a juvenile, the United States 
Supreme Court appears to have now crafted one.345 
 
 341.  People v. Jiles, 251 N.E.2d 529, 531 (Ill. 1969) (“While there would probably be 
almost universal agreement that it is desirable for a State to maintain a juvenile court . . . we 
are aware of nothing in the constitution of the United States or of this State that requires a 
State to do so.”); State v. Green, 544 P.2d 356, 361 (Kan. 1975) (“[T]he Kansas Legislature 
could, in the exercise of its wisdom, withhold the protection of the doctrine of parens patriae 
from all juveniles exceeding fifteen years of age.”); State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361, 1363 (Fl. 
1980) (finding no inherent or constitutional right to be treated as a juvenile). 
 342.  See, e.g., Woodard v. Wainright, 556 F.2d 781, 785 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[T]reatment 
as a juvenile is not an inherent right but one granted by the state legislature, therefore the 
legislature may restrict or qualify that right as it sees fit, as long as no arbitrary or 
discriminatory classification is involved.”). 
 343.  Kristen Simms Cross, When Juvenile Delinquents Are Treated as Adults: The 
Constitutionality of Alabama’s Automatic Transfer Statute, 50 ALA. L. REV. 155, 174 (1998) 
(recounting past unsuccessful challenges to direct filing practices, but forecasting different 
results in future litigation). 
 344.  See MARK W. LIPSEY ET AL., supra note 14, at 8 (reporting on overwhelming 
popular support for early intervention, treatment, and rehabilitation of youth). 
 345.  See Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida to Challenge Juvenile Transfer Laws, 71 
LA. L. REV. 99, 137 (2010) (“Although the Graham Court passively accepts the 
constitutionality of youth being tried as adults, the issue has never been properly brought 
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That is, Roper,346 Graham,347 and Miller348 all stand for the 
proposition that youth under the age of eighteen, as a class, demand 
unique analysis and consideration when compared with adults—
except in unusual circumstances. As argued by Elizabeth Scott, this 
necessarily means that only in the rarest and most serious cases can 
juveniles face adult prosecution, and only after an individualized 
transfer hearing.349 While not the focus of Professor Scott’s inquiry, 
this same analysis should also prohibit automatic prosecution of low-
level youthful indiscretions, like traffic offenses and ordinance 
charges, in adult courts, including local municipal courts. 
Indeed, in light of its recent decision in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 
it is obvious the Court intended for the evolving standards of youth 
doctrine to apply beyond the sentencing context and to justice 
system processing of young people more generally.350 In J.D.B, the 
Court held that under Miranda v. Arizona, courts needed to analyze 
the question of “custody” from the perspective of the juvenile at the 
time of police questioning.351 That is, the Court in that context too 
required specialized analysis and approaches for children in conflict 
with the law. 
As noted by juvenile advocate and expert Marsha Levick, “the 
Court’s recognition of a reasonable juvenile for the purposes of the 
Miranda custody analysis augurs a broad shift in the analysis of a 
juvenile’s guilt, criminal responsibility, and conduct across a wide 
spectrum of American criminal law.”352 J.D.B., therefore, provides 
further support for a claim that minors under age eighteen deserve 
special treatment in case prosecution, with the default venue of first 
resort being juvenile court. 
 
before the Court, and lawyers should not disregard potential claims using the Eighth 
Amendment.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 346.  See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 347.  See generally Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 348.  See generally Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 349.  See Scott, supra note 82, at 100–01. 
 350.  J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2399 (2011). 
 351.  Id. 
 352.  See also Marsha L. Levick & Elizabeth-Ann Tierney, The United States Supreme 
Court Adopts a Reasonable Juvenile Standard in J.D.B. v. North Carolina for Purposes of the 
Miranda Custody Analysis: Can a More Reasoned Justice System for Juveniles Be Far Behind?, 47 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 501, 503 (2012). 
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Absent such a position, state juvenile justice systems that allow 
for juveniles under the age of eighteen to be prosecuted and 
punished in municipal courts, without any prior finding relating to 
their special maturity, seriousness of their offense deserving adult 
treatment, or lack of need for heightened protections, are simply 
arbitrary. That is, beyond pushing youth in the lowest level cases into 
adult court proceedings with no prior process, many municipalities 
focused on increasing local finances actually deny youth the basic 
Gault due process protections they would receive if prosecuted in 
juvenile court—including the right to counsel. 
And even where a particular part of a state justice system is not 
required as a matter of substantive constitutional law, it must be 
administered in a rational manner.353 When a specially protected class 
is denied such privileges or access, the deprivations must be even 
more carefully scrutinized.354 Thus irrationally denying certain 
groups of minors access to treatment in our juvenile courts violates 
both equal protection and due process principles. Looking at this 
from a different angle, arbitrarily exposing certain youth to the 
punitive features of an adult municipal court system runs afoul of the 
constitution.355 That is because state criminal justice and punishment 
schemes must not be administered in a capricious or 
haphazard fashion.356 
Thus, such indefensible in loco juvenile justice practices that fail 
to account for youth under the age of eighteen as a special class, may 
 
 353.  See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 13 (1956) (noting that a state may not, 
“consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment[,] . . . deny adequate appellate review to the poor while granting such review to 
all others”); see also Mae C. Quinn, Reconceptualizing Competence: An Appeal, 66 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 259, 289 (2009) (“But the Supreme Court has held that once a state does confer 
the right to appeal it must provide a system that is fundamentally fair and that provides for 
‘adequate and effective’ review of a defendant’s claims.”). 
 354.  See, e,g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). But 
see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (declining to apply 
suspect class analysis to children in educational rights setting). 
 355.  Cf. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 84 (1992) (discussing how the Due Process 
clause prohibits arbitrary state action, particularly when liberty is at stake). 
 356.  See e.g., Ferman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (striking down Georgia’s 
death penalty scheme for being “arbitrary and capricious”); Denmore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 
551–52 (2003) (noting that “selecting a class of people for confinement on a categorical basis 
and denying members of that class any chance to dispute the necessity of putting them away” 
violates the Due Process Clause). 
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provide further constitutional ammunition for demanding a right to 
juvenile court as venue of first resort—at least in low-level municipal 
offense cases.357 
V. CONCLUSION—JUVENILE COURT AS FIRST RESORT 
We find ourselves in a historic moment. Constitutional juvenile 
law now demands that juveniles—youth under the age of eighteen—
must be seen as a discreet class of people who deserve special 
treatment in our justice system. The Supreme Court’s last four 
decisions relating to juveniles and juvenile justice have laid the 
groundwork for fundamentally rethinking of practices of the past, 
not just for youth sentencing, but the ways in which we deal with 
young people throughout the policing, processing, and 
prosecution spectrum. 
Similarly, events that have unfolded in Ferguson, Missouri have 
surfaced previously overlooked problems of local municipal policing 
and prosecution practices. This too has resulted in bold reassessment 
of local justice systems. Assembly-line justice, deprivations of the 
right to counsel, and punishment for poverty have all been called out 
for the travesties that they are. 
Taken together, these events cry out for a further related reform 
effort—that is, removing minors from municipal court prosecutions 
largely focused on enhancing local coffers, not child well-being. 
Instead, juveniles should be directed to properly functioning youth-
centered juvenile courts. And there they should not only receive the 
protections provided under Gault, but should also be addressed like 
the still developing children they are.358 
In this way, we can begin to put an end to in loco juvenile justice 
practices and move towards a more coherent system in this country 
for kids who are in conflict with the law—one where child-centered 
juvenile courts are the venues of first resort for everyone under the 
age of eighteen. 
 
 357.  See also Appell, supra note 250, at 754 n.240 (calling for a constitutional 
amendment to provide enhanced rights and protections for children). 
 358.  Again, as discussed supra note 40, many of our nation’s juvenile courts are in 
tremendous need of improvement too. However, it would seem to make the most sense to 
engage in youth prosecution reforms under one roof—rather than in multiple state and local 
venues spread out across a region. 
